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1Religious Organizations and Free Exercise:
The Surprising Lessons of Smith
Kathleen A. Brady1
Introduction
Much has been written about the protections afforded by the Free Exercise 
Clause when government regulation impacts the religious practices of individuals, 
and if one looks for guidance from the Supreme Court, the rules are fairly clear. 
Government action designed to thwart religious exercise is, of course, 
unconstitutional.2 A more difficult issue arises when the state does not intend to 
burden religious exercise but does so inadvertently. Prior to 1990, the Supreme 
Court had long employed a balancing approach that afforded significant relief. 
Under this approach, developed in the seminal case Sherbert v. Verner3, 
individuals were entitled to exemptions from laws which substantially burdened 
religious conduct unless enforcement was justified by a compelling state interest.4
In 1990, in Employment Division v. Smith,5 the Supreme Court abandoned this 
balancing test for all but a few categories of cases.6 Under the Court’s new rule, 
the Free Exercise Clause does not excuse individuals from compliance with 
neutral, generally applicable laws that are not intended to burden religious 
1
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2 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 523, 532-33 (1993); 
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
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 The Court applied this approach in numerous cases. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal 
Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 
141 (1987); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 
717-18 (1981); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (“only those interests of 
the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free 
exercise of religion”).  During this period, the Supreme Court applied a more deferential approach 
in the context of the military, see Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), and prisons, see
O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). In addition, free exercise protections were not available 
where the relief sought by the claimant would have required the government to change the way it 
managed its own internal affairs. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 
U.S. 439 (1988); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
5
 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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 The balancing test still applies to “hybrid situations” involving free exercise claims in 
conjunction with other constitutional rights. See id. at 881-82.
2exercise.7 Scholarly writing addressing the proper scope of free exercise
protections for individuals has been extensive, and even more than a decade after 
Smith, individual free exercise rights remain a familiar subject in the academic 
literature.8
The scholarly and judicial landscape is much different when one turns to 
the free exercise rights of religious organizations. Just as in the case of 
individuals, government regulation frequently impacts the activities of religious 
groups. For example, common areas of litigation include the application of federal 
antidiscrimination statutes to employment decisions, the imposition of mandatory 
collective bargaining requirements under state and federal labor laws, the 
application of state licensing, teacher certification and curriculum requirements to 
church-operated schools, zoning and historic preservation regulation, and the 
licensing and regulation of religiously affiliated social services programs. 
However, while clashes between churches9 and regulators are recurring, one finds 
fewer scholarly works addressing the free exercise rights of religious groups and 
much less guidance from the Supreme Court. Indeed, the Supreme Court has, 
surprisingly, never directly addressed the scope of free exercise protections when 
government regulation interferes with the internal affairs of religious groups. The 
7 See id. at 878-79.
8
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Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2000) 
[hereinafter McConnell, Singling out Religion]; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise 
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990); Ellis West, The Case 
Against a Right to Religion-based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 591 
(1990). For historical analyses, see Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical 
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990); Philip A. 
Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. 
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9
 I use the term “church” broadly to refer to both Christian groups as well as nonChristian 
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3Court has addressed claims for tax exemptions, but none of these cases has 
involved government action which directly impinges on internal church 
operations.10
While no case has addressed this issue directly, Supreme Court precedents 
involving religious groups provide support for three very different approaches. On 
the one hand, there is some support for a broad right of “church autonomy”11 that 
prohibits government interference with internal church affairs regardless of 
whether the activities affected are religious in nature or more mundane 
administrative matters. On the other hand, Supreme Court decisions also support 
an approach that mirrors Smith’s rule for individuals. When government action is 
neutral and generally applicable, religious groups are not entitled to special relief 
even if the regulation burdens religious practices. In between these two options, a 
third approach provides limited relief where government regulation impinges on 
religious practice or activity. Under this middle position, religious organizations 
do not have a broad right of autonomy over all internal affairs, but they are 
entitled to exemptions from laws which burden religious practice. Each of these 
approaches can be found in lower court decisions, and each has its supporters in 
the legal academy.
This article examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith for guidance 
in choosing among these three options. The use of Smith as a prism through which 
to analyze the free exercise rights of religious groups makes sense for several 
reasons. First, no satisfactory account of religious group rights can be developed 
without evaluating the ramifications of Smith. While Smith dealt with protections 
for individuals, courts and scholars know that they must wrestle with the meaning 
of Smith in the group context.  For some courts and scholars, the meaning of 
Smith for religious groups is simple: religious groups, just like religious 
individuals, are not entitled to special exemptions from neutral state action. For 
others, however, Smith is not relevant at all to the free exercise rights of religious 
groups, and they look to other lines of Supreme Court precedent for appropriate 
standards. My examination of Smith reveals that Smith is not only relevant to an 
analysis of religious group rights but is also very helpful for choosing among the 
three options outlined above. The opinion in Smith raises a number of issues that 
clarify what is at stake in making this choice, and its lessons are surprising. When 
read carefully, Smith supports a broad right of church autonomy that extends to all 
10
 See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990); Bob Jones Univ. v. 
United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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 Douglas Laycock popularized the use of this term in his influential piece, Towards a General 
Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church 
Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981).
4aspects of church affairs, the most religiously sensitive as well as the more 
mundane.
I. Three Possible Approaches
While the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the protections
afforded by the Free Exercise Clause when government regulation interferes with 
church affairs, a number of the Court’s decisions provide guidance. The earliest 
source of guidance is a series of cases regarding intra-church disputes over 
property.12 These decisions span over a hundred years, and within them, one finds 
arguments for all of the approaches to religious group rights outlined above. 
Several other Supreme Court cases also bear on this issue, and they, too, have left 
the choice between these approaches unresolved. In this section, I will examine 
these Supreme Court decisions and the support they provide for each of these 
approaches. I will then examine two lines of lower court cases that reflect these 
different possibilities, and I will observe the same split among legal scholars. 
A. Supreme Court Case Law
The first time that the Supreme Court addressed an intra-church dispute 
over property was in Watson v. Jones, decided in 1872. The litigation in Watson v. 
Jones arose when divisions over slavery and loyalty to the federal government 
resulted in a schism in the Presbyterian Church in the United States after the Civil 
War.13 The General Assembly, which functions as the highest judicatory in 
Presbyterian polity, had supported the union and opposed slavery, and after the
war ended, the General Assembly sought to enforce these views among church 
members.14 The General Assembly’s policy resulted in a split which affected the 
local congregation of the Walnut Street Church.15 As the congregation’s members 
divided over support for the General Assembly, both factions claimed the 
church’s property.16 The Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction based on diversity 
12
 These cases include: Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for 
the U.S. and Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Md. and Va. Eldership of the Churches of 
God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. 367 (1970); Presbyterian Church in the United 
States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kreshik 
v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the 
Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 (1929); Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872); 
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
13 See Watson, 80 U.S. at 690 -93.
14 See id. at  690-91.
15 See id. at 692.
16 See id. at 692-93.
5of citizenship and applied federal common law. While Watson v. Jones long 
antedated the Court’s application of the First Amendment to the states, the Court 
was guided by what it described as “a broad and sound view of the relations 
between church and state under our system of laws.”17  According to the Court, in 
America, “[t]he law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no 
dogma,”18 and individuals have the right to form voluntary religious associations 
for the expression, practice and dissemination of any religious doctrine that does 
not violate “the laws of morality or property” or “infringe on personal rights.”19
This freedom includes the right to create church tribunals for the resolution of 
contested questions,20 and when church members form a hierarchical polity, 
courts must defer to the highest of these tribunals on “questions of discipline, or 
of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law” when disputes arise.21 Applying 
this rule, the Court held that the property of the Walnut Street Church belonged to 
the faction loyal to the General Assembly.22
The Court gave several reasons for its rule. First, when individuals join 
together to form churches with hierarchical forms of governance, they voluntarily 
agree to submit to the decisions of church tribunals on disputed questions.23 When 
courts defer to the highest judicatory of a hierarchical polity, they are deferring to 
the choice made by church members. Second, deference also respects the proper 
boundaries between church and state. Quoting with approval the opinion of a 
South Carolina court, the Watson justices stated: “The structure of our 
government has, for the preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal 
institutions from religious interference. On the other hand, it has secured religious 
liberty from the invasion of the civil authority.”24 Finally, the Court observed that 
civil courts are “incompetent judges”25 of the intricacies of church teaching.26 If 
courts become embroiled in questions of faith and doctrine, they will “involve 
themselves in a sea of uncertainty.”27
17 Id. at 727.
18 Id. at 728.
19 Id. at 728-29.
20 See id. at 729.
21 Id. at 727.
22 See id. at 734.
23 See id. at 729.
24 Id. at 730 (quoting Court of Appeals of Equity of South Carolina in Harmon v. Dreher, 17 
S.C.Eq. (Speers Eq.) 87 (1843)). (Editor: Westlaw does not have original pagination online so I 
could not find a pincite)
25 Id. at 732 (quoting Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in German Reformed Church v. 
Commonwealth ex rel. Seibert, 3 Pa. 282 (1846)). (Editor: Westlaw does not have original 
pagination online so I could not find a pincite)
26 See id. at 729, 732.
27 Id. at 732.
6Within the Watson opinion, one can find support for all three approaches 
to government regulation of church affairs discussed above. One may argue, for 
instance, that the right to form voluntary religious associations and to determine 
rules for church governance requires broad protection from neutral government 
regulation as well as judicial deference in religious controversies. Whenever state 
laws interfere with church control over internal affairs, they infringe upon this 
freedom. Indeed, as Professor Laycock has noted, government regulation is “in 
some ways a greater intrusion” on the church because “regulation always imposes 
external rules.”28 A system of government that gives individuals the right to form 
religious associations, no matter how unorthodox, places church affairs beyond 
the competence of government. A broad right of church autonomy also best 
accords with the separationist views regarding church and state expressed in 
Watson. When the Court affirmed that in America, “religious liberty [is secured] 
from the invasion of the civil authority,”29 the justices were envisioning a sphere 
of institutional autonomy beyond the power of the state.
A less expansive view of religious group rights is also consistent with the 
reasoning in Watson. When Watson requires judicial deference on contested 
“questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law,”30 it 
may, indeed, require relief from government regulation that affects religious 
beliefs and practices, but such relief need not extend to matters that lack 
ecclesiastical or religious significance. If, for example, state regulation only 
affects secular aspects of church operations, religious freedom is not at issue and 
Watson has nothing to say. Moreover, a broad right of autonomy that extends to 
all aspects of church administration regardless of whether religious matters are 
implicated would be gratuitous favoritism that no other type of nonprofit or 
charitable organization enjoys. Watson supports limited protection when 
government regulation interferes with ecclesiastical matters or conflicts with 
church doctrine, but it does not support a broader right of church autonomy.
The Watson opinion supports yet a third interpretation. Watson is a 
decision about the limitations of judicial review in cases of intra-church 
controversies. It is not a case about neutral government regulation, and it does not 
require special protections for religious groups even when the state interferes with 
religious beliefs or practice. When courts address intra-church disputes over 
property, they seek a peaceful resolution of the controversy which accords with 
28
 Laycock, supra note XX, at 1396.
29 Watson, 80 U.S. at 730 (quoting Court of Appeals of Equity of South Carolina in Harmon v. 
Dreher, 17 S.C.Eq. (Speers Eq.) 87 (1843)). 
30 Id. at 727.
7the expectations of church members, and, thus, deference to the highest church 
tribunal in hierarchical polities makes sense. In this respect, the decision in 
Watson was not novel, nor were its underlying principles appropriate solely for 
religious organizations. Indeed, the Watson majority specifically stated at the 
outset of its opinion that it would be applying general principles applicable to all 
voluntary charitable associations.31
In cases involving neutral government regulation, additional state interests 
are at stake. When the government regulates, it does so to achieve legitimate, and 
often pressing, policy objectives. Special exemptions for religious organizations 
would undermine these objectives. Moreover, neutral government regulation of
church affairs does not infringe the freedoms protected in Watson. Watson affirms 
the right of individuals to join together in religious associations and to create 
tribunals to settle contested questions of faith and doctrine. When the government 
enacts neutral regulation rather than engages in the resolution of internal disputes, 
these tribunals have no role to play. Moreover, the freedom to determine internal 
church structures and governance does not imply a right to exemption from 
external rules that are the result of democratic decision making and apply equally 
to all similarly-situated associations.
Subsequent intra-church dispute decisions also support these multiple 
interpretations. In Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox 
Church in North America32, decided eighty years after Watson, the Court used 
some of its broadest language describing religious group rights. The Kedroff
Court found in Watson “a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an 
independence from secular control or manipulation, in short, power to decide for 
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as 
those of faith and doctrine.”33 According to Kedroff, this freedom has 
constitutional protection under the Free Exercise Clause.34 The Court expressly 
approved of Watson’s rule of deference in cases of internal church disputes,35 and 
affirmed as well a “rule of separation between church and state.”36 Drawing upon 
this separationist view, the Court identified a “freedom to select … clergy”37 and 
an “ecclesiastical right [to] … choice of … hierarchy.”38 In addition, the Court 
31 See id. at 714.
32
 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
33 Id. at 116.
34 See id. at 115-16.
35 See id. at 110-16, 120-21.
36 Id. at 110.
37 Id. at 116.
38 Id. at 119.
8spoke of protections for “church administration,”39 the “operation of … 
churches,”40 and “polity.”41 Thus, the Court seemed to come close to embracing a 
broad right of church autonomy over internal church administration and 
governance.
The holding in Kedroff is, however, limited. The litigation in Kedroff
concerned the right to occupy a Russian Orthodox cathedral in New York.42 After 
the Russian Revolution, the New York legislature had transferred control of the 
property from the central governing authority of the Russian Orthodox Church in 
Moscow to church authorities in America.43 The Kedroff Court held that the 
transfer of power from one church authority to another violated the First 
Amendment.44 Clearly, the Kedroff Court believed that intentional interference 
with church government is unconstitutional.  However, Kedroff did not address 
neutral government regulation which inadvertently interferes with church 
administration. Moreover, it is not clear from the Court’s opinion how far the 
independence that it envisions should extend. Protected aspects of church affairs 
include the choice of clergy and hierarchy and other “matters strictly 
ecclesiastical,”45 but whether more mundane aspects of church governance 
receive similar protection is left unresolved.   
These ambiguities remain in more recent decisions. For example, in 
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Canada v. 
Milivojevich,46 the Court held that courts must defer to church tribunals on 
matters of polity and administration as well as faith and doctrine.47 However, like 
Kedroff, this case involved an intra-church dispute, not neutral government 
regulation, and the scope of protected matters of church government is unclear. 
Milivojevich involved “quintessentially religious controversies” over church 
discipline and the choice of clergy,48 as well as diocesan reorganization, an “issue 
at the core of ecclesiastical affairs.”49 For matters involving less sensitive issues, 
the scope of First Amendment protection remains uncertain.
39 Id. at 107, 117.
40 Id. at 107.
41 Id. at 117.
42 See id. at 95-97.
43 See id. at 97-99, 105-07.
44 See id. at 110, 119.
45 Id. at 119.
46
 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
47 See id. at 710.
48 Id. at 720; see also id. at 717 (“Nor is there any dispute that questions of church discipline and 
the composition of the church hierarchy are at the core of ecclesiastical concern ….”).
49 Id. at 722.
9The Court’s most recent intra-church dispute case marks a substantial shift 
in the Court’s treatment of church controversies, but the same ambiguities remain. 
In Jones v. Wolf, 50 decided in 1979, the Court held that courts may, but need not, 
employ the rule of deference developed in Watson. Instead of automatically 
deferring to the decision of the highest tribunal in hierarchical polities, courts may 
use “neutral principles of law” to resolve the dispute or any other approach that 
does not require consideration of religious questions.51 Under the neutral-
principles approach, courts use secular principles of trust and property law to 
examine the language of deeds, church charters or constitutions, state statutes and 
any other relevant documents.52 Only when the interpretation of these documents 
would require courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions must courts defer to the 
decisions of religious bodies.53 The advantage of this approach is that it “free[s] 
civil courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, 
polity, and practice.”54
At first glance, the Court’s decision in Wolf seems to undermine the free 
exercise protections established in earlier cases. In Wolf, the Court’s priority 
appears to be avoiding judicial entanglement in religious questions. As long as 
there is no danger that courts will become embroiled in doctrinal issues, the Court 
indicates that any one of a number of approaches to intra-church disputes may be 
permissible.55 The dissent in Wolf observes that the result of applying neutral 
principles of law or another of these permissible approaches may well be to 
overturn the decision of church hierarchies.56 According to the dissent, such an 
outcome would interfere with the free exercise of religion.57 In the view of many 
scholars, the lesson for church organizations facing neutral government regulation 
is that such regulation will be sustained as long as its application does not require 
the examination of religious questions.58 Because neutral regulations are, by 
50
 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
51 Id. at 602.
52 See id. at 600-04.
53 See id. at 604.
54 Id. at 603; see also id. at 605 (“The neutral-principles approach … obviates entirely the need for 
an analysis or examination of ecclesiastical polity or doctrine in settling church property 
disputes.”).
55 See id. at 602.
56 See id. at 613-14, 616 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting).
57 See id. at 613-14, 616-17 & n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting).
58 See Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment 
Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391, 406-08 (1987); Marci A. Hamilton, Church Autonomy, The 
No-Harm Rule, and the Public Good, 2004 BYU. L. REV. ___________ (forthcoming); see also
Joanne C. Brant, “Our Shield Belongs to the Lord”: Religious Employers and a Constitutional 
Right to Discriminate, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 275, 294 (1994) (“Jones v. Wolf sharply 
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definition, secular standards, such entanglement will not occur often. Churches do 
not have an independent right to be free from government interference that does 
not involve state bodies in religious matters.
A second look at Wolf, however, reveals other possible interpretations of 
the majority’s decision. The Court in Wolf was careful to point out that the 
advantages of the neutral-principles method are not limited to nonentanglement. 
The use of neutral principles of law permits courts to avoid entanglement in 
ecclesiastical questions while at the same time securing free exercise values.59
Through appropriate use of secular language and property concepts, religious 
organizations can specify the resolution they would prefer in the event of a 
dispute.60 In this way, the neutral-principles approach “can ensure that a dispute 
over the ownership of church property will be resolved in accord with the desires 
of the members.”61 While the dissent argues that the neutral-principles method 
undermines free exercise rights, the majority insists that “[n]othing could be 
further from the truth.”62 Thus, the majority’s approval of the neutral principles 
method arguably reflects a continuing commitment to the free exercise rights of 
religious organizations as well as entanglement concerns. Such a commitment to 
free exercise is consistent with protections from neutral state regulation as well, 
either in the form of a broad right of church autonomy or more limited relief in 
situations where religious beliefs or practices are burdened.
Indeed, in its earlier decision in Presbyterian Church in the United States 
v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,63 the Supreme Court 
indicated that avoidance of judicial entanglement in religious doctrine itself serves 
free exercise values. In Hull, decided ten years before Wolf, the Court suggested 
for the first time that the use of neutral principles of law may be a permissible 
method for resolving church property disputes.64 Just as in Wolf, the Court 
appeared to give priority to entanglement concerns.65 However, the reason that the 
undermines any claim that the Free Exercise Clause confers a wide-ranging right of autonomy 
upon religious organizations.”).
59 See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 603-04.
60 See id. at 603.
61 Id. at 604. Whether the neutral-principles approach will always work as envisioned by the 
majority in Wolf has been questioned by Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in 
Conflicts over Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1881-86  (1998).
62 Wolf, 443 U.S. at 605-06.
63
 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
64 See id. at 449.
65 See id. at 445 (state has legitimate interest in resolving church property disputes but “[s]pecial 
problems arise … when these disputes implicate controversies over church doctrine and 
practice.”); id. at 447 (logic of Watson “leaves the civil courts no role in determining ecclesiastical 
questions in the process of resolving property disputes”); id. at 449 (“First Amendment values are 
11
Court gave for these concerns reflects a continuing commitment to free exercise. 
According to the Court, if courts become involved in resolving religious 
questions, “the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free development of 
religious doctrine.”66 The Court repeated this statement in Milivojevich.67 Thus, it 
is, in part, free exercise values that demand nonentanglement. 
To the extent that other forms of government action, such as neutral 
government regulation, also intrude upon the free development of religious 
doctrine, the reasoning in Hull supports additional relief. Indeed, the reasoning in 
Hull goes even further. In Hull, the Court’s concerns were not limited to actual 
burdens on the free development of religious doctrine. The Court was also 
concerned about the “hazard” or danger of such interference. If the danger of 
interference also raises First Amendment problems, arguably only a broad right of 
church autonomy would be sufficient protection. Any time that government 
regulation impacts internal church affairs, there is a real danger that the 
development of doctrine will be affected. Even where the regulation does not 
appear to touch upon matters of religious belief or doctrine, these hazards are 
present.
A handful of other Supreme Court cases that address protections for 
religious organizations also lend support to the three approaches to government 
regulation found within the Court’s intra-church dispute cases. For each approach, 
there is a decision that seems to favor it. However, like the Court’s intra-church 
disputes cases, none of these decisions squarely addresses the free exercise rights 
of religious groups. 
For example, in 1979, the same year that Wolf was decided, the Court 
seemed to approve a broad right of church autonomy in National Labor Relations 
Board v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago.68 The litigation in Catholic Bishop arose 
when unions of lay teachers at several Catholic secondary schools sought to 
bargain collectively with their diocesan employers under the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA).69 The dioceses refused on the grounds that application of 
the Act would impinge on their control over the religious mission of the schools 
plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil 
courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice.”); id. at 449 (First Amendment 
“commands courts to decide church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies 
over religious doctrine.”). 
66 Id. at 449.
67 See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 
U.S. 696, 710 (1976).
68
 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
69 See id. at 492-94.
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and, thus, violate the First Amendment.70 The Court agreed that application of the 
Act would give rise to serious constitutional questions.71 The Court identified the 
danger of entanglement in religious matters and also stated that “mandatory 
collective bargaining, regardless of how narrowly the scope of negotiation is 
defined, necessarily represents an encroachment upon the former autonomous 
position of management.”72 Whether the Court meant to suggest that any 
government regulation which interferes with internal church affairs raises First 
Amendment problems is unclear, and the Court did not elaborate further upon this 
statement. Following its statement, the Court did observe that ensuing conflicts 
between clergy-administrators and the National Labor Relations Board, and 
between administrators and union negotiators, would further entangle religion and 
government.73 Thus, it is possible that the Court simply meant that encroachment 
on church autonomy would exacerbate entanglement problems rather than raise an 
independent First Amendment problem. In any event, the Court in Catholic 
Bishop ultimately sidestepped resolving any constitutional questions and decided 
the case on statutory grounds. According to the Court, in view of the serious 
constitutional questions it identified, there must be a clear affirmative intent by 
Congress to cover the teachers under the NLRA before the Court would construe 
the Act to apply to them.74 Finding none, the Court declined to construe the Act to 
cover them and avoided resolving the First Amendment issues.75
In Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools,76 the 
Supreme Court seemed to support a different approach. The litigation in Dayton
arose when Dayton Christian Schools (Dayton) refused to renew the contract of a 
female teacher, Linda Hoskinson, after learning that she had become pregnant.77
The stated reason was that mothers should be at home when their children are 
young.78 When Hoskinson threatened litigation based on state and federal 
antidiscrimination laws, the school terminated her because she failed to follow the 
“Biblical chain of command” in seeking relief.79 Hoskinson then filed a complaint 
with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission alleging gender discrimination in 
70 See Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1123 (7th Cir. 1977).
71 See Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 501-04.
72 Id. at 503 (quoting Pa. Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 337 A.2d 262, 267 
(Pa. 1975)).
73 See id. at 503.
74 See id. at 501.
75 See id. at 507.
76
 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
77 See id. at 623.
78 See id. at 623.
79 Id. at 623-24.
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violation of state law.80 The school filed an action in federal court seeking to 
enjoin the administrative proceedings.81 The school argued that any investigation 
of Hoskinson’s claim or imposition of sanctions would violate the First 
Amendment.82 The Sixth Circuit agreed with the school and granted the 
injunction.83 The Supreme Court reversed. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Dayton was based on abstention 
grounds.84 According to the Court, Dayton will have an adequate opportunity to 
raise any constitutional arguments in the state proceedings.85 However, the Court 
also added that “however Dayton’s constitutional claim should be decided on the 
merits, the Commission violates no constitutional rights by merely investigating 
the circumstances of Hoskinson’s discharge … if only to ascertain whether the 
ascribed religiously-based reason was in fact the reason for the discharge.”86 By 
making this statement, the Court seems to suggest that the outcome of Dayton’s 
constitutional claim may turn on whether Dayton’s decision to discharge 
Hoskinson was, in fact, religiously motivated or whether the professed religious 
reason was merely pretextual. If the school’s reason for the discharge was actually 
religious, constitutional relief might be appropriate, but if the school’s decision 
was not religiously motivated, the Court suggests that application of 
antidiscrimination statutes would be permissible. An investigation into the 
school’s motive would not be relevant if the Court believed that all regulation 
impinging upon church control over internal operations were unconstitutional. 
Thus, the Court seems to reject a board right of church autonomy while it leaves 
open the possibility of narrower protections where government regulation 
interferes with religious belief and practice. One must be careful, however, not to 
read too much into the Court’s statement. The Court’s comment was brief and 
remains dicta. By resting its holding on abstention grounds, the Court did not 
resolve Dayton’s First Amendment claims. It is quite possible that upon full 
consideration of the constitutional issues involved, the Court would embrace 
broader protections than it seems to envision here. 
In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,87 the Court again left the scope of free exercise 
protections for religious organizations unresolved. At issue in Amos was a 
80 See id. at 623-24.
81 See id. at 624.
82 See id. at 624-25.
83 See id. at 625.
84 See id. at 622.
85 See id. at 628.
86 Id. at 628.
87
 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
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provision in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 exempting religious 
organizations from the Act’s prohibition against religious discrimination in 
employment.88  The exemption permits religious organizations to discriminate on 
the basis of religion in employment regardless of whether the employee engages 
in religious functions.89 While Congress had originally exempted only the 
organization’s religious activities, Congress broadened the exemption in 1972.90
This expanded exemption was challenged on Establishment Clause grounds, and 
the Amos Court upheld the exemption for all nonprofit activities.91 According to 
the Court, legislatures do not violate the Establishment Clause by seeking to lift 
significant regulatory burdens on the ability of religious groups to define and 
carry out their religious missions.92 Even where it seems that only secular 
activities are involved, “it is a significant burden on a religious organization to 
require it, on pain of substantial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular 
court will consider religious.”93 The line between religious and secular activities 
is not clear, and an organization would “understandably be concerned that a judge 
would not understand its religious tenets and sense of mission.”94 The resulting 
“[f]ear of liability might affect the way an organization carried out what it 
understood to be its religious mission.”95
The Amos Court conceived of burdens on religious belief and practice
broadly. Indirect interference with religious activity burdens a group’s religious 
mission just as direct intrusion on religious matters. The Court also observed that 
the inability of judges to fully understand different religious beliefs may limit 
their capacity to identify burdens on religious activity, and the Court concluded 
that broad legislative exemptions are permissible under the Establishment Clause. 
However, the Court did not address the scope of mandatory accommodations 
under the Free Exercise Clause; indeed, the Court expressly left the scope of free 
exercise protection unresolved.96 Amos tells us what government may do to 
alleviate government interference with religious groups, but it does not tell us 
what the government must do.
For many commentators, the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith provides 
the most relevant guidance when neutral government regulation impacts the 
88 See id. at 329-30. This exemption appears in section 702 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a).
89 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). 
90 See Amos, 483 U.S. at 332 n.9.
91 See id. at 330, 339.
92 See id. at 335-39.
93 Id. at 336.
94 Id. at 336.
95 Id. at 336.
96 See id. at 335-36.
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internal affairs of religious groups.97 Just as individuals are no longer entitled to 
special exemptions when neutral laws burden individual religious practice, 
religious groups also receive no special protections. When read in conjunction 
with Jones v. Wolf, Smith permits government regulation of churches where the 
regulations are neutral and generally applicable and their application would not 
entangle government bodies in religious questions. 
However, while this interpretation of Smith is certainly plausible, it is not 
the only possible reading, and the ambiguities discussed above remain. Smith
addressed the free exercise rights of individuals. The Court held that the Free 
Exercise Clause does not “relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 
‘valid and neutral law of general applicability…’”98 Under this reading, Smith
simply did not address the scope of free exercise protections for religious groups. 
Thus, while Smith may mean a lot for religious group rights, it may also mean 
little or nothing at all.
B. Lower Court Decisions
These multiple interpretations of Supreme Court precedent are reflected in 
lower court opinions. My discussion will focus on two related lines of cases. One 
line addresses the constitutionality of applying federal antidiscrimination statutes 
to the employment decisions of religious organizations. The second addresses the 
constitutionality of requiring religious organizations to bargain collectively under 
federal and state labor laws. I have chosen these cases for several reasons. First, 
many of the important scholarly works examining government regulation of 
religious groups have drawn upon decisions in these areas to develop and 
illustrate their arguments.99 Focusing on the same case law facilitates engagement 
with these scholars. Second, these cases reflect the full range of approaches to 
government regulation discussed above. Lower courts usually choose one of the 
97 See Brant, supra note XX, at 276-77, 280-81; Hamilton, supra note XX, at ____ (BYU 2004).
98
 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (emphasis added) (quoting United States 
v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)).
99 See, e.g., Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of 
Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514 (1979); Carl H. Esbeck, 
Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with Religious Organizations, 41 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347 (1984); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional 
Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99; Laycock, supra note XX; Lupu, 
supra note XX; Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in our 
Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37 (2002); William P. Marshall & Douglas C. Blomgren, 
Regulating Religious Organizations under the Establishment Clause, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 293 (1986).
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three approaches that can be found in Supreme Court case law, and one can find 
cases illustrating all of these approaches.
Lower court decisions addressing employment discrimination statutes 
generally support relief where these laws impinge upon the religious beliefs or 
practices of the organization. These cases usually reject a broad right of church 
autonomy that would extend to all aspects of church operations, and none favor 
the type of rule developed in Smith for individuals. They agree that religious 
groups are entitled to special protection under the Free Exercise Clause but only 
where religious matters are actually at stake. 
Most lower court litigation challenging the application of employment 
discrimination laws to religious organizations involves allegations of gender or 
race discrimination under Title VII or age discrimination under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).100 While Congress has exempted 
religious groups from prohibitions against religious discrimination in 
employment, federal statutes contain no exemptions for discrimination based on 
gender, race, age or other factors unrelated to religion. Because almost all lower 
courts to address the issue have found that Congress expressed an affirmative 
intent to cover religious organizations within these prohibitions,101 the courts have 
been unable to avoid constitutional questions on statutory grounds as the Supreme 
Court did in Catholic Bishop. 
100
 Cases have also involved claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, see Starkman v. 
Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999), sexual harassment suits under Title VII, see Bollard v. Cal. 
Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999), Equal Pay Act violations, see Dole v. 
Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 
F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986), and violations of the reporting requirements of Title VII, see EEOC v. 
Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981).
101 See, e.g., Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324, 331 (3rd Cir. 
1993); DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 172-73 (2nd Cir. 1993); Shenandoah, 899 
F.2d at 1394-95; Fremont, 781 F.2d at 1365-66; Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day 
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166-67 (4th Cir. 1985); EEOC v. Pacific Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 
1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981).
The exception is the Fifth Circuit, which has held that “Congress did not intend, through 
the nonspecific wording of the applicable provisions of Title VII, to regulate the employment 
relationship between church and minister.” McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560-61 (5th
Cir. 1972). Later Fifth Circuit decisions have found that Congress intended to cover other 
employment relationships within religious groups. See EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 
477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980). In Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hospitals, 929 F.2d 360 
(8th Cir. 1991), the Eighth Circuit assumed without deciding that Congress intended coverage of 
religious institutions under the ADEA. Id. at 361 & n.2; cf. Weissman v. Congregation Shaare 
Emeth, 38 F.3d 1038, 1041, 1045 (8th Cir. 1994) (congressional intent to cover religious 
organizations under ADEA unclear, but application of Act to temple administrator raises on 
serious constitutional questions).
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Beginning with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in McClure v. Salvation 
Army,102 lower federal courts have uniformly carved out what has become known 
as the “ministerial exception” to employment discrimination statutes.103 The 
McClure court describes the relationship between a church and its minister as its 
“lifeblood,”104 an area of “prime ecclesiastical concern,”105 and a matter “both 
basic and traditional.”106 Later courts have described this relationship as “close to 
the heart of church administration,”107 a “critically sensitive position,”108 a 
“quintessentially religious” matter,109 a “pervasively religious relationship,”110
and a “strictly ecclesiastical matter[].”111 Employment decisions regarding clergy 
are a “core matter of ecclesiastical self-governance with which the state may not 
constitutionally interfere.”112 Lower courts also agree that the ministerial 
exception applies even if there is no doctrinal basis for the discrimination.113 As 
102
 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
103
 For cases treating this exception, see Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 
F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 
2000); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2000); 
Starkman, 198 F.3d 173; Bollard, 196 F.3d 940; Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the 
United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 
455 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 
(7th Cir. 1994); Scharon, 929 F.2d 360; Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United 
Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Rayburn, 772 F.2d 1164; Pacific Press, 676 
F.2d 1272; Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d 277; Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477; McClure, 460 
F.2d 553; Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Colo. 1994); Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. 
of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
104 McClure, 460 F.2d at 558; see also Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1304 (same); Bollard, 196 F.3d at 
946 (same); Minker, 894 F.2d at 1357 (same).
105 McClure, 460 F.2d at 559; see also Minker, 894 F.2d at 1357 (same).
106 McClure, 460 F.2d at 559.
107 Whitney, 401 F. Supp. at 1368; see also Bollard, 196 F.3d at 946 (ministerial relationship is 
“close to the heart of the church”); id. at 949 (“A religious organization’s decision to employ or to 
terminate employment of a minister is at the heart of its religious mission.”); Pacific Press, 676 
F.2d at 1278 (ministerial duties “go to the heart of the church’s function”); McClure, 460 F.2d at 
560 (minister is at “the heart” of the church).
108 Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1278; see also Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (church-minister 
relationship is a “sensitive area[]”).
109 Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (quoting Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. and Can. v. 
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 720 (1976)).
110
 DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 171 (2nd Cir. 1993); see also Weissman v. 
Congregation Shaare Emeth, 38 F.3d 1038, 1044 (8th Cir. 1994) (same).
111
 Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 2000).
112 Bollard, 196 F.3d at 946. The First Amendment is violated when government “trespasses on 
the most spiritually intimate grounds of a religious community’s existence.” EEOC v. Roman 
Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 800 (4th Cir. 2000).
113 See e.g., Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2003); 
Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 801; Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist 
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the Fourth Circuit stated in Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day 
Adventists, in “’quintessentially religious’ matters, … the free exercise clause … 
protects the act of a decision rather than a motivation behind it.”114
No court has limited the ministerial exception to ordained clergy. The 
exception covers all employees with ministerial functions.115 The determination of 
which employees perform ministerial functions has yielded more variation among 
the courts. The proper inquiry has been described differently by different courts as 
some courts view ministerial functions more broadly than others. For example, in 
two early cases, the Fifth Circuit employed a narrow conception of clergy.116 The 
court described ministers as intermediaries between the church and its 
congregation or instructors in the “whole of religious doctrine.”117 More courts 
have followed the broader definition suggested by Bruce Bagni, who has 
identified ministers as those whose “primary duties consist of teaching, spreading 
the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or 
participation in religious ritual and worship.”118 According to these courts, this 
inquiry is designed to “determine whether a position is important to the spiritual 
and pastoral mission of the church.”119 In other cases, the test used to determine 
who is a minister is much less clear.120
Church, 173 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 464-65 
(D.C. Cir. 1996); Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 
186 (7th Cir. 1994); Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 
F.2d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169.
114 Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169. The court continued: “In these sensitive areas, the state may no 
more require a minimum basis in doctrinal reasoning than it may supervise doctrinal content.” Id.
115 See Alicea-Hernandez, 320 F.3d at 703; Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 801; Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 
461; Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1168.
116
 See EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), and EEOC v. Southwestern 
Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981).
117 Mississippi College, 626 F.2d at 485; Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 283-85 (quoting and 
drawing on Mississippi College).
118
 Bagni, supra note XX, at 1545, quoted in Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 801; Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 
461; Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169; Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343, 1347 (D. Colo. 1994).
119 Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169; Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 801 (quoting Rayburn); Catholic Univ., 83 
F.3d at 461 (quoting Rayburn).
120
 For example, in a recent opinion, the Ninth Circuit seemed to envision clergy narrowly as those 
who are “representatives” of the church, Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 
940, 947 (9th Cir. 1999), but the case did not require the court to examine the functions of any lay 
employees. In another recent decision, the Fifth Circuit employed a mélange of factors, including 
whether employment decisions are made largely on religious criteria, whether the employee 
performs ceremonies of the church, and whether the employee tends to the religious needs of the 
congregation. See Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1999). 
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Initially courts based the ministerial exception on two grounds. The first 
was the balancing approach that the Supreme Court applied to individual free 
exercise claims prior to Smith. According to the courts, interference with the 
choice of clergy heavily burdens religious practice, and this burden is not justified 
by a sufficiently compelling state interest.121 Furthermore, employment decisions 
regarding clergy are quintessentially religious matters of church government 
protected from state interference under the Court’s intra-church dispute 
decisions.122 Thus, the lower courts interpreted the Court’s intra-church dispute 
cases to provide relief where neutral government regulation interferes with 
important religious aspects of church affairs. After Smith, lower courts have 
continued to apply the ministerial exception based on these intra-church dispute 
cases.123 According to the courts, free exercise protections for individuals and 
groups must be distinguished.124 Protections for individuals are now governed by 
Smith and are limited. Individuals are not entitled to exemptions from neutral 
generally applicable laws which burden free exercise.125 However, in its intra-
church dispute precedents, the Supreme Court has articulated a different basis for 
relief where government interferes with the internal operations of churches.126
The courts emphasize the statement in Kedroff that churches have the right “to 
decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government 
as well as those of faith and doctrine.”127
In addition to the ministerial exception, lower courts have also 
acknowledged the possibility of relief where employment regulation conflicts 
with specific religious doctrines or practices. Such conflicts are rarely found 
because courts usually conclude that church doctrine does not support 
121 See Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1168-69; Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist 
Church, 21 F.3d 184, 185 (7th Cir. 1994) (approving Rayburn’s analysis).
122 See Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1167-68; Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 282; McClure v. 
Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 359-60 (5th Cir. 1972).
123 See Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 800 n.*; Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 
F.3d 1299, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 2000); Bollard, 196 F.3d at 945-46; Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual 
Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 348-50 (5th Cir. 1999); Catholic Univ., 
83 F.3d at 350-51.
124 See Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 800 n.*; Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1303-04; Combs, 173 F.3d at 348-49; 
Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 348, 350-51.
125 See Combs, 173 F.3d at 348-49; Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 350.
126 See Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 800 n.*; Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1303-04; Combs, 173 F.3d at 348-50; 
Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 350-51. 
127
 Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 
94, 116 (1952), quoted in Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 800 n.*; Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1303; Combs, 173 
F.3d at 350; Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 350..
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discrimination,128 but the courts have consistently affirmed the availability of such 
special protection. Initially, the court’s analysis proceeded under the pre-Smith
balancing approach.129 This same framework, indeed, the same balancing test has 
been applied even after Smith.130
Stepping back from the details of these cases, what one observes among 
the lower courts is limited protection for religious groups where government 
regulation burdens religious belief or practice. Where government regulation 
interferes with the organization’s choice of clergy, it, by definition, burdens 
religion. In the words of the D.C. Circuit, the “determination of ‘whose voice 
speaks for the church’ is per se a religious matter.”131 In cases involving 
nonministerial employees, a conflict between religious doctrine and secular 
employment standards must be established. In either case, however, courts have 
only granted relief in cases where religious matters are impinged. The courts have 
not recognized a broad right of church autonomy governing all aspects of church 
operations. They repeatedly distinguish regulations interfering with religious 
matters from those that touch only secular operations.132 It is not intrusion on 
church matters alone that is unconstitutional. The impact of regulation on the 
organization may be substantial but still permissible. The “relevant inquiry is not 
the impact of the statute upon the institution, but the impact of the statute upon the 
institution’s exercise of its sincerely held religious beliefs.”133 As the Ninth 
Circuit has explained, “while we recognize that applying any laws to religious 
institutions necessarily interferes with the unfettered autonomy churches would 
128 See EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986); EEOC v. Pacific 
Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1279 (9th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist 
Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 286 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist 
Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1397 (4th Cir. 1990) (Bible does not mandate pay differential based on 
sex); Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 1999) (church 
does not support sexual harassment prohibited by Title VII). 
129 See, e.g., Shenandoah, 899 F.2d at 1397-98; Fremont, 781 F.2d at 1367-69; Pacific Press, 676 
F.2d at 1279-81; Soutwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 286-87.
130 See, e.g., Bollard, 196 F.3d at 946, 948 (applying Sherbert balancing test where facts did not 
support ministerial exception).
131
 Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1356 
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting district court below); see also Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 805 (quoting 
Minker); Bollard, 196 F.2d at 949 (quoting Minker); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian 
Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting Minker).
132 See e.g., Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947-48; Shenandoah, 899 F.2d at 1397-98; Minker, 894 F.2d at 
1358; Fremont, 781 F.2d at 1368-69; Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 
772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985); Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1279-80; Southwestern Baptist, 
651 F.2d at 284-85; Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343, 1347 (D. Colo. 1994); Whitney v. 
Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
133
 EEOC v. Mississippi, 626 F.2d 477, 488 (5th Cir. 1980); Fremont, 781 F.2d at 1369 (quoting 
Mississippi College); Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1280 (quoting Mississippi College).
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otherwise enjoy, this sort of generalized and diffuse concern for church 
autonomy, without more, does not exempt them from the operation of secular 
laws.”134 Rather, the employment decision at issue must involve either a 
“protected choice,” such as the choice of clergy, or a “doctrinal” justification.135
One also observes that lower courts in the employment area have also 
uniformly rejected the rule in Smith as the standard for religious group rights. The 
courts have limited Smith to cases involving individual free exercise rights, and 
they have turned instead to the Supreme Court’s intra-church dispute precedent 
for guidance.
By contrast, in cases addressing the application of labor statutes to 
religious organizations, courts have been more willing to adopt the approach in 
Smith. Lower court case law in this area has been shaped significantly by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Catholic Bishop. Recall that the Court in Catholic 
Bishop construed the National Labor Relations Act to exclude lay teachers at 
religiously affiliated schools. According to the Court, application of the Act in 
this context would give rise to serious constitutional questions, and in the absence 
of clear congressional intent to cover the teachers, the Court declined to construe 
the Act to include them. Catholic Bishop was decided in 1979, and in the decade 
following that decision, lower federal courts narrowed the scope of the Supreme 
Court’s decision as they applied the Act to religiously-affiliated social services 
organizations such as hospitals,136 nursing homes,137 homes for neglected and 
troubled children,138 and day care centers.139 According to these courts, no serious 
First Amendment problems arise in these contexts. Entanglement problems under 
the Establishment Clause are unlikely because the programs function just like 
secular charitable enterprises, and unlike schools, they do not involve the 
dissemination of religious doctrine.140 While these programs may be religiously 
motivated, their activities are primarily and essentially secular.141
134 Bollard, 196 F.3d at 948.
135 Id. at 948.
136 See St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. NLRB, 715 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1983); St. Elizabeth Cmty. Hosp. v. 
NLRB, 708 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 1983).
137 See Tressler Lutheran Home for Children v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 302 (3rd Cir. 1982). 
138 See Volunteers of America-Minnesota-Bar None Boys Ranch v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 345 (8th Cir. 
1985); NLRB v. St. Louis Christian Home, 663 F.2d 60 (8th Cir. 1981); see also Denver Post of 
the Nat’l Soc’y of the Volunteers of America v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 769 (10th Cir. 1984) (church-
operated programs for troubled children as well as programs providing shelter for women and 
children and a program for victims of crime).
139
 See NLRB v. Salvation Army of Mass. Dorchester Day Care Ctr., 763 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985). 
list
140 See Volunteers of America, Los Angeles v. NLRB, 777 F.2d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(addressing church-operated detoxification and resident recovery programs); Bar None Boys 
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Lower federal courts also found that requiring these social services 
organizations to bargain collectively under the Act would not give rise to free 
exercise problems. All of these decisions pre-date Smith, and like courts in the 
employment discrimination context, courts in the labor area analyzed the free 
exercise rights of religious organizations under the balancing approach that the 
Court had developed for individual free exercise claims. The courts concluded 
that the primarily secular character of the social services organizations ensures 
that mandatory collective bargaining under the Act will only minimally impact
religious practices.142 The courts also observed that none of the churches 
operating these programs have religious objections to bargaining with unions.143
Moreover, any minimal burden will be outweighed by the government’s 
compelling interest in protecting worker rights and securing labor peace.144 As in 
the employment area, the courts repeated that “the relevant inquiry is not the 
impact of the statute upon the institution, but the impact of the statute upon the 
institution’s exercise of its sincerely held religious beliefs.”145
More recently, state and lower federal courts have gone even further and 
upheld the application of state labor laws to lay teachers at church-operated 
schools.146 According to these courts, unlike the NLRA, the state labor provisions 
clearly cover teachers at religiously affiliated schools, and, thus, the constitutional 
Ranch, 752 F.2d at 348-49; Denver Post, 732 F.2d at 771-73; St. Elizabeth Cmty Hosp., 708 F.2d 
at 1140-42; Tressler, 677 F.2d at 305; St. Louis Christian Home, 663 F.2d at 64-65.
141 See Volunteers of America, Los Angeles, 777 F.2d at 1390; Bar None Boys Ranch, 752 F.2d at 
348; Salvation Army, 763 F.2d at 6; Denver Post, 732 F.2d at 772-73; St. Elizabeth Hosp., 715 
F.2d 1193, 1196; St. Elizabeth Cmty. Hosp., 708 F.2d at 1441; Tressler, 677 F.2d at 305; St. Louis 
Christian Home, 663 F.2d at 64.
142 See St. Elizabeth Cmty. Hosp., 708 F.2d at 1442-43; see also Bar None Boys Ranch, 752 F.2d
at 349 (impairment of sectarian objectives or practices unlikely); Tressler, 677 F.2d at 306-07 
(“Although recognition of the union will impose some constraints upon Tressler’s operation of the 
[nursing] Home, direct religious conflict is neither inevitable nor probable.”).
143 See St. Elizabeth Cmty. Hosp., 708 F.2d at 1442-43; Tressler, 677 F.2d at 306.
144 See St. Elizabeth Cmty. Hosp., 708 F.2d at 1442-43; Tressler, 677 F.2d at 306-07.
145 St. Elizabeth Cmty. Hosp., 708 F.2d at 1442 (quoting EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 
477, 488 (5th Cir. 1980), and EEOC v. Pacific Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1280 (9th Cir. 
1981)); see also NLRB v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1991) (same) 
(upholding application of NLRA to nonfaculty employees at church-operated residential school 
for boys).
146 See Catholic High Sch. Ass’n of the Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161 (2nd Cir. 
1985); South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus Church 
Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d 709 (N.J. 1997); New York State Employment Relations Bd. v. Christ 
the King Reg’l High Sch., 682 N.E.2d 960 (N.Y. 1997); Hill-Murray Fed’n of Teachers v. Hill-
Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857 (Minn. 1992).
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issues avoided in Catholic Bishop must be addressed.147 These courts have 
uniformly found that mandatory collective bargaining under state law would 
result neither in excessive entanglement prohibited by the Establishment Clause 
nor in a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.148 In Catholic High School 
Association of the Archdiocese of New York v. Culvert,149 the only case decided 
prior to Smith, the Second Circuit analyzed the free exercise claim under the 
Sherbert balancing approach.150 According to the Second Circuit, collective 
bargaining under New York’s statute does not conflict with religious doctrine.151
Indeed, the court observed that the Catholic Church has long supported unions 
and worker rights.152 The court also found that the state’s compelling interest in 
protecting the rights of employees and preserving labor peace outweighs any 
minimal burden on free exercise rights.153
After Smith, courts addressing the application of state labor provisions to 
religiously affiliated schools have uniformly adopted the rule in Smith. According 
to the courts, labor laws are neutral laws of general applicability, and, thus, 
religious organizations are not entitled to any special exemptions unless their 
claims fall within one of the few categories of cases where Smith preserved the 
balancing approach.154 At first glance, the decision of lower courts to follow 
Smith in the labor area but not in cases involving employment discrimination may 
seem puzzling. However, this difference can, perhaps, be explained by the fact the 
free exercise analysis in labor cases had always been narrower. Unlike cases 
involving employment discrimination laws, lower courts evaluating labor statutes 
never drew upon the Supreme Court’s intra-church dispute cases for guidance.155
147 See Culvert, 753 F.2d at 1163, 1164 (New York State Labor Relations Act was amended in 
1968 to bring employees of charitable, educational and religious organizations within its scope); 
St. Teresa, 696 A.2d at 713, 714 (New Jersey Constitution guarantees persons in private 
employment the right to organize and bargain collectively); Hill-Murray, 487 N.W.2d at 862 
(while legislature did not consider application of Minnesota Labor Relations Act to religious 
organizations, Minnesota’s rules of statutory construction clearly support their coverage).
148 See Culvert, 753 F.2d at 1166-71; St. Teresa, 696 A.2d at 585-602; Christ the King, 682 N.E.2d 
at 963-66; Hill-Murray, 487 N.W.2d at 862-64..
149
 753 F.2d 1161 (2nd Cir. 1985).
150 See Culvert, 753 F.2d at 1169.
151 See id. at 1170.
152 See id. at 1170.
153 See id. at 1170-71.
154 See South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus Church 
Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d 709, 597-98 (N.J. 1997); New York State Employment Relations Bd. 
v. Christ the King Reg’l High Sch., 682 N.E.2d 960, 963-64 (N.Y. 1997); Hill-Murray Fed’n of 
Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857, 862-63 (Minn. 1992).
155
 The Seventh Circuit in Catholic Bishop had cited this line of precedent once, see Catholic 
Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1120 (7th Cir. 1977), but the Supreme Court did not 
draw upon this precedent, nor have subsequent lower court decisions.
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They relied entirely on the Court’s pre-Smith balancing approach. Even the 
Supreme Court in Catholic Bishop made no reference to the Court’s intra-church 
dispute decisions when it found that the application of the NLRA to church-
operated schools would give rise to serious First Amendment questions. Thus, 
when Smith was decided, it is not surprising that the abandonment of the Court’s 
balancing test meant the adoption of the Smith rule. In the labor area, in contrast 
to the employment context, the lower courts did not have on hand alternative 
precedent to support continuing protections.
In none of these cases, however, does one find a whole-hearted 
commitment to the implications of Smith. For example, in New York State Labor 
Relations Board v. Christ the King Regional High School,156 the New York Court 
of Appeals purported to follow Smith when it rejected a Catholic high school’s 
objection to coverage under New York’s labor statute,157 but the court left open
the possibility that relief might be granted in situations where the collective 
bargaining process actually impinges upon religious belief or practice.158
Likewise, in Hill-Murray Federation of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High School,159
the Minnesota Supreme Court followed Smith when evaluating a Catholic high 
school’s First Amendment challenge to coverage under Minnesota’s labor 
statute,160 but the court then applied a balancing approach under the state’s 
constitution.161 Noting the Catholic Church’s traditional support for unions,162 the 
court found no violation of state free exercise rights as long as mandatory subjects 
of bargaining are restricted to wages, hours and other secular terms of 
employment.163 In South Jersey Catholic School Teachers Organization v. St. 
Teresa of the Infant Jesus Church Elementary School164as well, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court followed Smith but also applied a balancing approach. The 
schools in that case had attempted to establish a “hybrid claim” involving the Free 
Exercise Clause in conjunction with the freedom of association and the right of 
parents to control the upbringing of their children.165 Where such hybrid claims 
can be established, Smith preserves the balancing approach developed in Sherbert, 
156
 682 N.E.2d 960 (N.Y. 1997).
157 See Christ the King, 682 N.E.2d at 963-64.
158 See id. at 964, 966.
159
 487 N.W.2d 857 (Minn. 1992)
160 See Hill-Murray, 487 N.W.2d at 862-63.
161 See id. at 864-65.
162 See id. at 865.
163 See id. at 866 (“While Hill-Murray may have demonstrated that the application of the MLRA 
[Minnesota Labor Relations Act] interferes with their authority as an employer, they have not 
established that this minimal interference excessively burdens their religious beliefs.”).
164
 696 A.2d 709 (N.J. 1997).
165 See St. Teresa, 696 A.2d at 598-99.
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but the New Jersey Court found no support for the schools’ associational or 
parental rights claims.166 Even so, the New Jersey court applied the Sherbert
balancing test and found no free exercise violation.167 According to the court, as 
long as mandatory bargaining is limited to secular terms and conditions of 
employment, the state’s compelling interest in preserving labor peace and worker 
rights outweighs the burden on free exercise.168
While courts in the labor area have, perhaps, been reluctant to commit 
fully to the implications of Smith, lower courts in other contexts have more 
readily embraced Smith. While this Article focuses on legislative regulation in the 
labor and employment contexts, examples of such readiness may be found in 
cases applying secular tort standards to religious entities. Increasingly, courts are 
adopting the Smith rule in cases involving tort claims against churches whose 
clergy have engaged in sexual abuse of children or sexual misconduct involving 
adults. These courts have held that claims for negligent hiring and supervision of 
clergy and breach of fiduciary duty do not violate the Free Exercise Clause 
because the applicable tort principles are neutral rules of general applicability.169
The Supreme Court’s intra-church dispute cases are distinguished on the ground 
that they prohibit entanglement with religious doctrine, not application of neutral 
government rules.170 According to a recent decision by the Florida Supreme 
Court, “[t]o hold otherwise and immunize the Church Defendants from suit could 
risk placing religious institutions in a preferred position over secular institutions, a 
concept both foreign and hostile to the First Amendment.”171
So far my discussion of labor and employment cases has included 
illustrations of two of the three approaches to government regulation of religious 
groups that can be found in Supreme Court precedent. Courts addressing 
employment discrimination statutes have provided relief where the government 
burdens religious belief and practice. In the labor context, courts after Smith have 
taken a different approach and have held that religious organizations are not 
166 See id. at 597-99.
167 See id. at 599-600.
168 See id. at 581, 588-90, 600.
169 See e.g., Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347, 354, 361, 364 (Fla. 2002); Doe v. Evans, 814 So.2d 
370, 376 (Fla. 2002); Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 268 F. Supp.2d 139, 144-
45 (D. Conn. 2003); Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 921 F. Supp. 66, 73-74 (D. Conn. 
1995). But see Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441, 445 (Me. 1997) 
(“To import agency principles wholesale into church governance and to impose liability for any 
deviation from the secular standard is to impair the free exercise of religion and to control 
denominational governance. Pastoral supervision is an ecclesiastical prerogative.”).
170 See Malicki, 814 S.2d at 363-64; Doe v. Norwich, 268 F. Supp.2d at 144.
171 Malicki, 814 So.2d at 365.
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entitled to special exemptions from neutral regulation even if the government 
interferes with religious matters. No case has yet to adopt the third approach and 
establish a broad right to autonomy over all internal operations. There are, 
however, several decisions approving the ministerial exception that have used 
language consistent with such a right. 
Indeed, when the Fifth Circuit first carved out the ministerial exception in 
McClure v. Salvation Army, the court used broad language to describe the rights 
of religious organizations. The court began by recalling that the First Amendment 
“has built a ‘wall of separation” between church and State.”172 The court then 
turned to the Supreme Court’s intra-church dispute cases, which, in the courts 
words, “place matters of church government and administration beyond the 
purview of civil authorities.”173 The court repeated the statement in Kedroff that 
this line of cases “radiates … a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an 
independence from secular control or manipulation, in short, power to decide for 
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as 
those of faith and doctrine.”174 The Fifth Circuit expressly limited its decision to 
the church-minister relationship,175 and it never stated that all matters of church 
administration, no matter how secular or mundane, are protected by the First 
Amendment. However, the court left open that possibility, and the language that it 
did use was broad.
Subsequent Fifth Circuit cases decided shortly after McClure interpreted 
McClure and the ministerial exception narrowly.176 According to these cases, only 
where there is an actual burden on religious beliefs and practice is protection 
warranted.177 However, broad language reappears in later cases, most prominently 
in the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in EEOC v. Catholic University of America178 and 
the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Combs v. Central Texas Annual Conference 
of the United Methodist Church.179 Within the Supreme Court’s intra-church 
172
 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972).
173 Id. at 559.
174
 Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 
94, 116 (1952), quoted in McClure, 460 F.2d at 560.
175 See McClure, 460 F.2d at 555.
176 See EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist 
Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981); see also supra text accompanying notes 116-
17. 
177 See Mississippi College, 626 F.2d at 488 (“the relevant inquiry is not the impact of the statute 
upon the institution, but the impact of the statute upon the institution’s exercise of its sincerely 
held religious beliefs.”).
178
 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
179
 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999).
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dispute cases, the D.C. Circuit finds a “constitutional right of a church to manage 
its own affairs free from government interference”180 and the “affirmation of a 
church’s sovereignty over its own affairs.”181 The court “agree[d] with the Fifth 
Circuit [in McClure] that ‘throughout these opinions there exists a spirit of 
freedom for religious organizations, an independence from secular control or 
manipulation …’”182 Churches have the “freedom to decide how [they] will 
govern [themselves]”183 and a “constitutional right of autonomy in [their] own 
domain.”184 Likewise, the Fifth Circuit in Combs spoke of the “fundamental right 
of churches to be free from government interference in their internal management 
and administration.”185 Secular authorities may not “insert[]” themselves into “the 
internal management of a church,” which is “a realm where the Constitution 
forbids [them] to tread.”186 Like the McClure court, the court in Combs recalls the 
“constitutional mandate to preserve the separation of church and state.”187
Neither the D.C. Circuit in Catholic University nor the Fifth Circuit in 
Combs stated that the protected realm of church affairs extends to all matters, 
secular and religious alike, and their holdings were limited to affirming the right 
of churches to make employment decisions regarding ministers free from 
government interference. However, neither court restricted the protected area to 
the choice of clergy, and the language and spirit of these opinions seems to go 
much further. These cases leave open the possibility of a broad right of church 
autonomy and, indeed, provide the supporting framework.
C. Scholarly Views
The same split that appears among lower court opinions is also found in 
scholarly literature addressing the rights of religious organizations. The most 
prominent defense of a broad right of church autonomy has been made by 
Douglas Laycock.188 According to Laycock, the Supreme Court’s intra-church 
180 Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 460.
181 Id. at 463.
182 Id. at 462 (quoting McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972) (quoting 
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94, 
116 (1952))).
183 Id. at 463.
184 Id. at 467.
185
 Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 350 
(5th Cir. 1999).
186 Id. at 350.
187 Id. at 351.
188 See Laycock, supra note XX; see also Douglas Laycock, The Right to Church Autonomy as 
Part of Free Exercise of Religion, in GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, II, at 
28 (Dean M. Kelley ed., 1986).
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dispute cases, its decision in Catholic Bishop, and its commitment to 
nonentanglement all support a strong “right of church autonomy” under the Free 
Exercise Clause.189 Laycock argues that “churches have a constitutionally 
protected interest in managing their own institutions free of government 
interference,”190 and this right “extends to every aspect of church operations,” 
including “to routine administrative matters.”191 According to Laycock, 
government regulation need not burden religious beliefs or practices to violate the 
First Amendment;192 any interference with “church control of church 
institutions”193 is prohibited. The right of church autonomy is essentially a right 
“to be left alone.”194
Of course, Laycock recognizes that a right to church autonomy cannot be 
absolute.195 There must be some limits to protect nonmembers and even members 
in truly compelling circumstances. While I will be defending a broad right of 
church autonomy in this Article, I will not be tackling the difficult issue of where 
these limitations lie. However, some general observations are helpful. First, any 
limitations on the right of church autonomy must be drawn narrowly and must 
identify with specificity the permissible areas of government regulation. As is 
seen from the labor cases discussed above, courts applying the pre-Smith
balancing approach readily found compelling state interests to justify government 
regulation. Lower federal courts upholding the application of labor statutes to 
religious employers identified the government’s interest in preserving labor peace 
and protecting worker rights.196 Given the small number of religious employers in 
the overall economy and the fact that the National Labor Relations Board had for 
decades declined jurisdiction over nonprofit institutions, religious and 
nonreligious alike,197 the existence of such a compelling state interest in the 
context of religious employers was doubtful.
189
 Laycock, supra note XX, at 1394-98; Laycock, supra note XX, at 32-34 (Kelley book). 
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 Laycock, supra note XX, at 1373.
191 Id. at 1398.
192 See id. at 1373, 1398.
193 Id. at 1394.
194 Id. at 1376.
195 See id. at 1394.
196 See supra notes 144, 153, 168 and accompanying text.
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 The Board began asserting jurisdiction over nonprofit organizations in the early 1970s, and 
shortly thereafter adopted the same jurisdictional standards for nonprofit and forprofit 
organizations. See Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Mandatory Collective 
Bargaining under Federal and State Labor Laws: Freedom From and Freedom For, 49 VILL. L. 
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Thus, instead of a general compelling state interest test that leaves 
outcomes uncertain, limitations on the right of church autonomy should take the 
form of narrowly tailored restraints in specific areas where government regulation 
is appropriate. When identifying these areas and restrictions, the strong 
presumption must be in favor of freedom for religious groups. For example, one 
area of appropriate regulation would be protections for outsiders. Religious 
organizations can be held liable upon their valid contracts, and tort liability is also 
appropriate where there are injuries to outsiders.198 Contracts with church 
members and employees should also be enforceable if the language and
circumstances of the agreement would clearly lead the promisee to believe that 
the contract was civilly enforceable.199 However, the contract terms must be clear 
and capable of interpretation without involving the courts in religious questions. 
In addition, courts should avoid adjudicating contract claims involving ministers 
unless the agreement expressly provides for such secular enforcement.
Regulations designed to protect the health and safety of members and 
employees would also be appropriate where serious bodily harm is threatened.200
Slightly broader protections may be permissible for children and for adults whose 
impaired mental or physical condition makes them especially vulnerable to 
exploitation. Thus, tort liability for inadequate supervision of church employees 
would be appropriate where clergy engage in sexual abuse of minors or sexual 
misconduct with vulnerable adults. However, in keeping with the strong 
presumption in favor of organizational freedom, such liability should probably be 
limited to cases where church officials acted recklessly rather than merely 
negligently,201 and liability for negligent hiring or retention involving clergy 
should be prohibited altogether. Protection of child welfare may also justify 
regulation in the context of church-operated schools, but such regulations must 
also be narrow and limited. States might, for instance, require schools to 
198
 Laycock agrees. See Laycock, supra note XX, at 1406.
199
 Laycock would require clear evidence that the church desires secular adjudication. See 
Laycock, supra note XX, at 1404 & n.238; Douglas Laycock & Susan E. Waelbroeck, Academic 
Freedom and the Free Exercise of Religion, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1455, 1468 (1988). My suggestion is 
slightly different. Even if organizational consent to secular adjudication cannot be established, 
contracts with members or employees would be enforceable if the language and circumstances of 
the agreement would lead the promisee to believe that such adjudication was contemplated.
200
 Again, Laycock agrees. See Laycock, supra note XX, at 1417.
201 If claims for negligent supervision are permitted, the result will be the imposition of secular 
standards of care on organizations that may have their own highly-developed procedures and 
practices for clergy oversight and discipline. Where such secular standards displace practices that 
reflect the group’s religious values or traditional understandings of organizational structure and 
responsibility, the interference will be great. Such interference is appropriate where the 
organization’s leaders have acted recklessly, but organizational freedom should, arguably, prevail 
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demonstrate that students achieve at minimum levels of proficiency on 
standardized tests, but direct regulation of educational programs should be 
prohibited. In addition, where religious organizations hold themselves out as 
providers of professional services such as legal advice or medical care, they can 
be required to meet generally applicable professional standards.
These examples are not designed to be definitive or exhaustive. My 
purpose has, rather, been to illustrate several important points. First, the right of 
church autonomy is strong, but it is not absolute. In some circumstances, 
regulations protecting church members and nonmembers are appropriate, but 
these circumstances are narrow and limited. Second, there is no simple test to 
identify when regulations are permissible and when they are not. Depending on 
the area of government regulation, the appropriate restrictions on the right of 
church autonomy may be different. Vigorous protection of religious organizations 
requires careful delineation of the rules appropriate in each context.
Whether the receipt of government aid justifies greater regulation is a 
separate but very important question. Certainly, law makers and funding agencies 
can require religious organizations to account for their expenditures of public 
funds in order to ensure that these funds are spent for the intended purposes and 
programs. Scholars debate whether the government may go further and apply 
regulations designed to shape the internal practices of funded organizations in the 
direction of public values.202 This question has become more pressing in recent 
years.  While the social services programs of many religious denominations have 
long received significant amounts of government aid, until recently Supreme 
Court precedent placed substantial limitations on aid to programs suffused with 
religious purpose and function. In the last few years, the Supreme Court has 
revised its Establishment Clause doctrine to permit greater aid to these types of 
religious organizations,203 and the current administration is pushing hard for 
increased funding for faith-based organizations, including organizations with 
significant religious identity and activity. 
202
 For articles engaging this debate, see the recent symposium on “Public Values in an Era of 
Privitization,” held at Harvard Law School. Contributions are published in volume 116, number 5 
of the Harvard Law Review (March 2003). See also Steven K. Green, Religious Discrimination, 
Public Funding, and Constitutional Values, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (2002); Lupu & Tuttle, 
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203 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding voucher aid to religious 
schools); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (holding that church-operated schools may 
receive secular educational equipment and materials under neutral direct aid program).
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The extent to which government funding may justify greater regulation of 
religious groups is beyond the scope of this Article, but the basic principles I 
develop here provide the necessary foundation for addressing this issue. If, as I 
argue, a broad right of church autonomy benefits not only religious groups but 
also the larger community by protecting alternative visions for social and political 
life, regulations designed to shape internal practices according to prevailing 
public values would be short-sighted and illegitimate. Permissible regulations 
would instead focus largely on ensuring accountability when public funds are 
expended and protecting recipients from coercion, abuse and exploitation. 
While Laycock and a few other scholars have supported a broad right of 
church autonomy,204 more scholars have favored the path taken by lower courts in 
the employment discrimination area. Like courts which have carved out the 
ministerial exception, some of these scholars have identified certain aspects of 
church administration which should receive special protection under the First 
Amendment. For example, Bruce Bagni has argued that the “purely spiritual” 
matters at the “core or heart” of the church should be protected from government 
regulation except where the state’s interest is truly compelling.205 According to 
Bagni, these matters are the “spiritual epicenter” of the church, and within this 
epicenter, Bagni includes the relationship between church and minister, 
membership policies, religious education, worship and ritual.206 Where activities 
lie outside this epicenter, they can be regulated in proportion to their degree of 
secularity.207
Carl Esbeck supports a similar distinction under the Establishment Clause. 
Esbeck envisions the Establishment Clause as a “structural restraint on 
governmental power”208 that bars the government from intruding on “inherently 
religious”209 matters. These matters include those “exclusively religious 
204 See Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality under the Religion Clauses, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 146, 
158-61 (1986); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 27-
28; cf. Steven D. Smith, Separation and the “Secular”: Reconstructing the Disestablishment 
Decision, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 955, 1018 (1989) (institutional separation required by the Establishment 
Clause prohibits government from interfering in the internal affairs of religious organizations). 
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84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 2 (1998).
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285, 309 (1999). [Editor: keep in order]
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activities” at the core of the organization’s religious identity,210 and include 
worship, teaching, propagation of the faith, doctrine, ecclesiastical polity, church 
discipline, membership rules, and personnel decisions regarding clergy and other 
employees chosen on the basis of religion.211 According to Esbeck, within this 
“domain,” churches have a “sphere of autonomy” that is outside the competence 
and jurisdiction of the state.212 With respect to matters that are not inherently 
religious, such as some aspects of social services work, the Establishment Clause 
permits regulation,213 though even here “[a] special wariness should characterize 
the relationship.”214
Professors Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle also draw upon the Establishment 
Clause and envision a “zone”215 of religious activity that is beyond the 
competence and jurisdiction of government.216 This area of “ecclesiastical 
immunity”217 consists of the “aspects of the behavior of religious institutions that 
are bound up with the sacred,”218 and includes matters such as the employment of 
clergy,219 worship,220 and organizational polity.221 According to Lupu and Tuttle, 
when “religious institutions act in uniquely religious ways, making connections 
with the world beyond the temporal and material concerns … of the state,” they 
are protected from government interference.222 On the other hand, where the 
functions of religious institutions resemble other nonprofits, Lupu and Tuttle 
favor a rule of neutrality that treats religious and nonreligious institutions alike.223
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Each of these scholars draws a line between specially protected religious 
activities and activities that do not receive special treatment. Those matters that 
are quintessentially or inherently religious are accorded strong protection from 
government intervention, but other practices can be regulated. Thus, religious 
organizations receive some relief from state regulation, but the areas of relief are 
limited. Other scholars who support limited relief favor the balancing approach 
developed by the Supreme Court prior to Smith. For example, in an article written 
in 1986, William Marshall and Douglas Blomgren favored free exercise 
protections where government regulation interferes with religious practices or 
conflicts with matters of church doctrine.224 Regulation of core religious activities 
like the employment of clergy would infringe upon free exercise,225 but so would 
other types of government interference with religious doctrine and practice. 
Marshall and Blomgren do not draw distinctions between quintessentially 
religious activities and those which are less religiously significant.
The final approach to government regulation of religious institutions also 
has supporters in the academy. According to these scholars, religious 
organizations are not entitled to special protections from neutral government 
regulation even when religious practice is burdened. For example, Marci 
Hamilton argues that the rule in Smith should be extended to cases involving 
religious groups.226 In his earlier work, Ira Lupu also rejected special exemptions 
for religious organizations.227 Lupu’s defense of this approach pre-dates Smith, 
and he turns instead to the Supreme Court’s intra-church dispute cases for 
support. In Jones v. Wolf, Lupu argues, the Court “made clear that the 
constitutional evil to be avoided” is not interference with organizational free 
exercise but entanglement with religious doctrine.228 While the Wolf Court did 
argue that the neutral-principles method it approved is consistent with free 
exercise values, religious organizations are afforded no special freedoms under 
this approach.229 The ability of religious organizations to structure legal 
documents and transactions to ensure desired outcomes in the event of disputes is 
no different than the freedoms enjoyed by other corporate bodies.230
224 See Marshall & Blomgren, supra note XX, at 327. Marshall has become a leading opponent of 
free exercise exemptions, and he has defended the Court’s decision in Smith. See Marshall, In 
Defense of Smith, supra note XX; Marshall, The Case Against, supra note XX.
225 See Marshall & Blomgren, supra note XX, at 327-28.
226 See Hamilton, supra note XX, at ______ (BYU forthcoming).
227 See Lupu, supra  note XX, at 395, 399,  431.
228 Id. at 407.
229 See id. at 407-08.
230 See id. at 407-08.
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Lupu also observes that special protections for religious organizations 
would result in advantages that favor religious associations over secular ones.231
Many other scholars have found this type of favoritism troubling,232 and some, 
like the Florida Supreme Court discussed above, have found such a “preferred 
position” problematic under the Establishment Clause.233 In addition, many 
observe that the trend on the Supreme Court is towards a neutralism that treats 
religious and nonreligious entities equally for Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clause purposes.234 Smith embraced this neutralism in the free exercise field, and 
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris235 permitting 
religiously-affiliated schools to participate in voucher programs embraced 
neutralism in the Establishment Clause field.236
Lupu makes an additional observation. The behavior of religious 
organizations, including the group’s internal practices, affects society at large. 
Religious institutions, “like other important social institutions, are influential in 
shaping behavior and moral convictions.”237 Thus, what goes on inside the 
institution has consequences for those outside of the organization, and exemptions 
from neutral, generally applicable government policies, such as antidiscrimination 
policies, may harm others.238 Church members are not the only ones who have an 
interest in internal church affairs,239 and special protections often come at the 
expense of the larger community.240
II. Lessons from Smith
231 See id. at 401-03.
232 See, e.g., Eisgruber & Sager, supra note XX, at 1248; Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free 
Exercise Doctrine, supra note XX, at 927; Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation, supra note XX, at 556, 
574 (1998); Marshall, In Defense of Smith, supra note XX, at 319-23.
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As the previous section demonstrates, Supreme Court precedent, lower 
court case law and scholar writing leave us with three very different approaches to 
neutral government regulation that interferes with the internal affairs of religious 
organizations. In this section, I will identify the approach that I believe to be the 
most appropriate. As I noted in the introduction, I will be using the Smith decision 
as a prism through which to analyze the rights of religious organizations under the 
Free Exercise Clause. For some courts and scholars, Smith has nothing to say 
about free exercise protections for religious groups. Smith addresses only the 
rights of individual believers, and other precedents, such as the Court’s intra-
church dispute cases, provide the standard for religious groups. For other courts 
and scholars, Smith means the same thing for religious groups as it does for 
individuals. Neither receive special protection when neutral regulation interferes 
with religious practice. In my view, neither interpretation is correct. The rule in 
Smith for individual believers is not the same standard that should apply to 
government regulation of religious groups. However, the analysis in Smith is not 
irrelevant to assessing the scope of religious group rights. To the contrary, Smith
raises a number of issues that help to clarify what is at stake in choosing among 
the different options. When these issues are examined closely, the results are 
surprising. Smith supports a broad right of autonomy for religious groups that 
extends to internal matters with clear religious significance as well as activities 
that appear more mundane or secular.
A. Religious Groups and Freedom of Belief
The first guidepost that Smith provides lies in the first few sentences of its
analysis when the Court draws a distinction between protections for religious 
beliefs and protections for religious action. According to Smith, the “free exercise 
of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever 
religious doctrine one desires.”241 Watson v. Jones expressed a similar view. In 
America, the “law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, 
the establishment of no sect.”242 Action receives less protection. While an 
individual is free to believe whatever they choose, the Free Exercise Clause does 
not guarantee the right to act on these beliefs where neutral laws of general 
applicability stand in the way.243 An individual’s religious beliefs do not “excuse 
him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the 
State is free to regulate.”244
241
 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876 (1990).
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According to the Court, greater protection for action under the balancing 
approach developed in Sherbert is problematic for several reasons. First, if a 
religious believer is entitled to an exemption whenever the government burdens 
religious conduct and the state’s interest is not compelling, the believer will 
“become a law unto himself,”245 and chaos will ensue.246 Such a rule is especially 
dangerous in a nation that includes and values diverse religious beliefs.247
Furthermore, the Sherbert balancing test unfairly privileges religious liberty over 
other constitutional rights.248 In other contexts such as the Equal Protection and 
Speech Clauses, compelling state interest analysis produces “equality of treatment 
and an unrestricted flow of contending speech”; here it would “produce a private 
right to ignore generally applicable laws[,] [which] is a constitutional 
anomaly.”249 In addition, limiting free exercise protection to burdens on religious 
practices that are central to the believer’s faith is unworkable.250 Judges are not fit 
to investigate and determine which beliefs are central in different religious 
traditions.251
While the Free Exercise Clause does not require individual exemptions 
from neutral laws of general applicability, Smith does envision legislative 
relief.252 The Free Exercise Clause reflects a solicitude for religious liberty that 
can be expected from the democratic processes as well.253 The Smith Court points 
to and approves of the frequency of reasonable legislative accommodations.254
While the Court admits that minority religious practices will be at a “relative 
disadvantage” in this process, this is unavoidable and preferable to the anarchy 
that is threatened under the Sherbert approach.255
Thus, in the world that Smith envisions the beliefs and actions of religious 
individuals are treated very differently. In the realm of ideas, Smith envisions 
unrestricted freedom. The Free Exercise Clause entitles individuals to believe and 
profess whatever doctrines they desire, and Smith expects that individuals will 
hold a wide range of different religious views, orthodox as well as unorthodox, 
popular and unpopular. Restrictions on religious practice are, by contrast, 
245 Id. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879))
246 See id. at 888.
247 See id. at 888.
248 See id. at 886.
249 Id. at 886.
250 See id. at 886-87.
251 See id. at 886-87.
252 See id. at 890.
253 See id. at 890.
254 See id. at 890.
255 Id. at 890.
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unavoidable, but Smith hopes that legislatures will make accommodations where 
reasonable. Moreover, Smith does not expect restrictions on action to affect the 
complexity and diversity of opinion. Religious individuals will continue to hold 
whatever religious beliefs they desire even if the beliefs are not actionable. In 
many cases, religious adherents will be successful in petitioning the legislature for
relief from burdensome laws. Adherents of minority religions will be at a 
disadvantage in the legislative process, but they will not be absent. Their actions 
may be circumscribed, but their beliefs will be free.
The Smith Court says little about the conditions that would be necessary to 
maintain the type of unrestricted freedom of belief that it envisions. The Court 
does state that the government may not regulate religious beliefs as such,256 and it 
also assumes that government regulation which impairs individual practice will 
not undermine the individual’s choice of belief. However, the Court does not 
elaborate further. Nor does Smith address the proper treatment of religious groups 
under the Free Exercise Clause. Further examination of both these issues reveals 
an important link between them. Religious groups play an indispensable role in 
shaping and fostering the freedom of belief that Smith envisions and is committed 
to.
Numerous scholars have observed the connection between religious 
groups and individual religious convictions. Individuals express and exercise their 
beliefs in religious communities,257 and religious organizations also play an 
essential role in shaping the beliefs that individuals hold.258 As Frederick Gedicks 
has written, “[g]roups are ongoing and independent entities that influence in their 
own right how individuals think, express themselves, and act.”259 Thus, 
“[a]lthough in some respects groups are aggregations of their individual members, 
in other respects, groups are prior to and independent of their members.”260
Justice Brennan draws the same connection between individual religious belief 
and group activity in his concurrence in Amos.261 According to Justice Brennan, 
256 See id. at 877.
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“[f]or many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in large measure from 
participation in a larger religious community.”262 These religious groups do not 
simply express individual religious beliefs, but the “community represents an 
ongoing tradition of shared beliefs, an organic entity not reducible to a mere 
aggregation of individuals.”263
Groups play yet another important role in the formation of individual 
belief. Religious communities are the vehicle for the development of doctrine. It 
is through religious communities that individuals jointly develop religious ideas 
and beliefs. Thus, the very formulation of religious opinions takes place within 
religious groups as well as the transmission and exercise of beliefs. Religious 
groups do not simply shape their members, nor do fellow congregants simply 
exercise preexisting convictions with like-minded believers. Rather, religious 
communities are part of an ongoing conversation which both shapes individuals 
and is shaped by them. In the sometimes rough and tumble of congregational and 
denominational life, individuals work together to define, refine, and reform 
religious ideas. Indeed, this process is not limited to single congregations or even 
single denominations. It takes place in a larger environment where religious 
groups and their members constantly interact with and influence one another. As 
communities face new circumstances and experiences, they may look to other 
groups for guidance, or they may sharply distinguish themselves, or they may do 
some of both. Individuals and subgroups may split, new communions may be 
formed, and old ones reformed. The lines that separate group from group are 
porous, and individuals, subcommunities and ideas cross back and forth.
Nor is the development of religious ideas and doctrine an abstract affair. 
Religious organizations do not simply teach or formulate doctrine in the abstract. 
They also seek to live out their beliefs in their relationships with fellow 
communicants. They seek to put their beliefs into action in organizational 
structure, discipline, the rights and duties of members and employees, and in more 
informal social expectations and standards. Indeed, it is through this process of 
living beliefs in community that ideas are tested and, again, refined and reformed. 
It is also through this process that beliefs are preserved. Without the ability to put 
ideas into practice within the community, it would be difficult for the group to 
maintain its commitments and convictions. Indeed, without the opportunity to 
practice their convictions in community life, church members may not be able to
fully understand what their beliefs mean and require. Restrictions on individual 
action outside the community may not undermine religious belief if these 
262
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opportunities are present, but restrictions on internal group life could be 
devastating. 
If religious groups play an essential role in shaping individual religious 
belief and, indeed, in the very formulation of religious ideas, the freedom of belief 
that Smith envisions requires protections for religious organizations. If religious 
communities are not able to teach, develop and live out their ideas free from state 
interference, individual belief will also be suppressed. The diversity of religious 
beliefs that Smith envisions presupposes a diversity of religious communities, 
each of which is able to structure its own internal life according to its own unique 
religious views and perspectives. Supreme Court precedent under the Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment provides support for such protection. The 
Supreme Court has long held that the individual’s freedom to engage in speech 
activities under the First Amendment requires a “corresponding right” to associate 
with others for those ends.264 The right of association is “implicit” in First 
Amendment protections for freedom of speech.265 Similarly, protections for
religious groups are implicit in the Free Exercise Clause’s commitment to 
freedom of religious belief and profession. Full freedom of belief is not possible 
without a corresponding right of religious groups to teach, develop and practice 
their doctrines and ideas.
Thus, of the three approaches to government regulation of religious groups 
that can be found in existing Supreme Court precedent, the rule in Smith for 
individual religious exercise is, surprisingly, the least compatible with the 
decision’s underlying principles. Special protections for religious organizations 
are necessary at least where government regulation interferes with religious belief 
or practice. Such protections would not give rise to the same risk of chaos that the 
Smith Court feared in the context of individual religious exercise. The exemption 
of individuals from neutral laws of general applicability whenever a burden is 
proved and a compelling state interest is absent may, indeed, be “courting 
anarchy.”266 However, the same danger does not arise when religious 
organizations are exempted from compliance with regulations that interfere with 
internal community life. Permitting religious groups to shape community practice 
according to shared norms may have a great impact upon the lives of members 
and employees, but any direct effect on the larger society will usually be minimal. 
Where outsiders would be harmed, limitations can be imposed as discussed 
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above. Federal courts holding that the ministerial exception survives Smith agree. 
According to the D.C. Circuit, “the ministerial exception does not present the 
dangers warned of in Smith.”267 Protections for the internal affairs of religious 
organizations do not “empower a member of that church, ‘by virtue of his beliefs, 
‘to become a law unto himself.’’”268
Nor would special protections for religious organizations be inconsistent 
with the equality that Smith prescribes for individuals. For many scholars, Smith
reflects the trend toward neutralism in the Court’s recent case law. In both the free 
exercise and establishment areas, the Supreme Court is increasingly treating 
religious individuals and entities like nonreligious ones.269 However, it is 
important not to read too much into the Smith decision. The Court in Smith did 
hold that the Free Exercise Clause does not require special exemptions for 
believers when neutral government regulations burden religious practice.  
However, the Court did not hold that believers and nonbelievers must always be 
treated alike. To the contrary, the Court permits and, indeed, encourages 
legislatures to make special accommodations when religious practice is burdened. 
Smith does not reject all special or favorable treatment for religion. Indeed, it 
expects and approves of such favoritism.  Protections for religious groups would 
be consistent, not inconsistent, with Smith.
B. Misunderstandings and Temptations
If special protections for religious groups are necessary to preserve the 
freedom of belief that Smith envisions, the next step is to determine how far these 
protections should extend. Does Smith call for a broad right of church autonomy 
or should protections be limited to situations where religious belief or practice is 
267
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actually burdened? Certainly, religious groups should be entitled to relief where 
government regulation conflicts with specific doctrines or practices. The 
application of secular standards where such a conflict exists would impede the 
organization’s ability to preserve and develop doctrine. Indeed, in some cases, the 
effect of such application would be to inject the government directly into religious 
disagreements and decision making. For example, if Title VII’s prohibition 
against gender discrimination in employment were applied to ministerial 
decisions by religious groups, the government would be lending its support to one 
side in a long-running struggle within American congregations over the proper 
role of women in ministry. Those who favor female clergy would be heavily 
favored over those with more conservative views.  Indeed, any time that 
government regulation addresses difficult social or moral issues that also divide 
church members, the imposition of the secular standard will disrupt the process by 
which the religious group develops its own doctrine and beliefs. Many Americans 
may approve of the results in cases where religious groups hold unpopular or out-
dated views. However, the First Amendment protects the freedom of individuals 
to hold these views, and religious groups are entitled to the protections that make 
such freedom possible. 
Protections for religious organizations could also be extended to areas of 
activity that scholars have identified as quintessentially or inherently religious. 
Placing matters such as the church-minister relationship, religious education and 
worship outside of the competence of government makes sense insofar as these 
aspects of church administration are closely related to the group’s religious 
mission. As federal courts carving out the ministerial exception have argued, 
interference with such core religious matters by definition burdens religion.
Whether courts should go further and recognize a broad right of church 
autonomy over all internal affairs is a more difficult issue. If religious 
organizations receive relief whenever there are identifiable burdens on religious 
exercise or quintessentially religious matters are involved, would further 
protection be gratuitous favoritism that unfairly advantages religious groups over 
nonreligious ones? On the other hand, is a broad right of church autonomy 
necessary to fully protect the ability of religious groups to preserve and transmit 
their unique beliefs and ways of life?
To answer this question, one must look at another issue raised in Smith. 
One of the reasons given by the Smith majority for its rule regarding individual 
religious practice is the difficulty that judges would have in identifying which 
beliefs are central in different religious traditions. Providing relief whenever a 
believer’s religious conduct is burdened by government action would produce 
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chaos, but limiting exemptions to situations involving practices central to the 
individual’s faith is unworkable. Judges do not have the ability to make such 
determinations: “[i]t is not “within the judicial ken to question the centrality of 
particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ 
interpretations of those creeds.”270 If this concern is explored further in the group 
context, it becomes clear that limiting judicial relief to actual burdens on group 
belief or practice may be preferable in theory but it is unworkable in fact. Judges 
are no more fit to make the types of inquiries required under such an approach 
than they are to identify which beliefs are central in different religious traditions. 
The danger that judges will misunderstand an organization’s beliefs and practices 
or be tempted to distort these beliefs in order to reach desired outcomes is 
considerable whether the judge is trying to carve out specially sensitive areas of 
church life or attempting to ascertain whether government regulation conflicts 
with specific religious teachings. For both types of inquires, it is possible to point 
to numerous cases where judges have inadvertently, and sometimes willfully, 
misunderstood organizational belief. The result is significant impingement on 
religious doctrine and practice. The only reliable way to protect the religious 
beliefs and activities of religious groups is a broad right of church autonomy that 
extends to all aspects of church affairs even the most routine and mundane.
The difficulty that courts have in ascertaining whether government 
regulation burdens specific religious beliefs or practices is illustrated well by 
cases in the labor and employment area. These cases demonstrate that judicial 
efforts to identify burdens fail for several reasons. For example, two circuit court 
opinions addressing instances of gender discrimination in church-operated schools 
illustrate the temptation that judges experience to misread church doctrine in 
order to reach desired outcomes. In EEOC v. Fremont Christian School,271 the 
EEOC sought to enforce Title VII and the Equal Pay Act against a conservative 
Christian school that offered health insurance to single employees and married 
men but not to married women.272 Fremont Christian School (Fremont) grounded 
its policy on biblical teaching that the husband is the head of the household in a 
marriage and is required to provide for the family.273 The Ninth Circuit rejected 
Fremont’s free exercise argument because it found that application of Title VII 
and the Equal Pay Act would not have a “significant impact”274 on the school’s 
270 Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (quoting Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 
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beliefs and only minimal impact on practice.275 The court pointed to a statement 
made by the pastor of the church that operated Fremont. According to the pastor, 
“the Church, believing as it does, in the God-given dignity and the special role of 
women, could not, without sin, treat women according to unfair distinctions.”276
The court drew a connection between this statement and the facts of an earlier 
case where it had applied Title VII to a religious organization which denied 
endorsing gender discrimination in employment.277 The court also noted that the 
school had abandoned its earlier practice of paying married men more than 
married women and offered the same life and disability insurance to both men and 
women.278
The court’s argument that application of the federal statutes would not 
significantly burden Fremont’s religious beliefs and practice is strained if not 
disingenuous. Application of these statutes would prohibit a practice with clear 
religious grounding and would prevent Fremont from recognizing the different 
roles of men and women in its employment policies. The court twists the words of 
Fremont’s pastor when it suggests that the church’s teaching does not support pay 
and benefit differentials between men and women. The pastor never stated, and, 
indeed, the church denied,279 that men and women should be treated equally in all 
respects. “Unfair distinctions” are prohibited, but not all distinctions. Fremont 
clearly believed that different roles for men and women in marriage make 
employment distinctions based on the husband’s role as head of the household 
both fair and appropriate. While Fremont chose to give women equal pay and 
insurance benefits, it had religious reasons for differential treatment regarding 
health benefits. For Fremont, the Bible provides clear support for a policy that is 
now prohibited by government regulation. The court essentially second-guessed 
the school’s understanding of its own beliefs and minimized the burden of 
government regulation on the school.
The Fourth Circuit in Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church280 made a 
similar mistake. Like Fremont, Shenandoah involved a conservative Christian 
school that gave special benefits to married men based on the biblical belief that 
the husband is the head of the household.281 The school was operated by the 
275 See id. at 1369.
276 Id. at 1368.
277 See id. at 1368 (drawing on EEOC v. Pacific Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1279 (9th Cir. 
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Shenandoah Baptist Church. Before salaries were increased across the board, 
Shenandoah paid married male teachers a salary supplement that was not 
provided to married women.282 The federal department of labor, joined later by 
the EEOC, sought to enforce the Equal Pay Act,283 and the Fourth Circuit held 
that application of the Act would not violate the Free Exercise Clause.284 As in 
Fremont, the court found that any burden on Shenandoah’s beliefs would be 
minimal.285 According to the court, “[t]he pay requirements at issue do not cut to 
the heart of Shenandoah beliefs.”286 Shenandoah did not claim that the Bible 
mandates a pay differential between men and women, and it had voluntarily 
phased out the supplement on its own.287 The court’s conclusion that application 
of the federal statute would not cut to the heart of Shenandoah’s beliefs ignores 
the effect of its holding. Shenandoah believes that men and women have different 
roles in the marriage relationship and that these different roles authorize 
differential treatment in employment settings. Application of the federal statute 
would prohibit such differential treatment. While Shenandoah no longer pays men 
and women differently, it believes that such differential treatment is biblically 
based, and, after the court’s ruling, it no longer has the freedom to use pay 
differentials. The court has, in effect, prohibited the church from living out beliefs 
with clear religious grounding.
In Fremont and Shenandoah, the temptation to reach desirable results 
undoubtedly contributed to judicial second-guessing of church doctrine and to 
minimizing the impact of government regulation on church life. In other cases, 
failure of courts to identify burdens on group practices and belief results from an 
unfamiliarity with church doctrines. The complexity of church doctrine and its 
development over time often makes ascertaining conflicts between government 
regulation and church doctrine particularly difficult. State and lower federal court 
cases upholding the application of labor statutes to church institutions illustrate 
these problems. 
Many of these cases have involved social services organizations or schools 
operated by the Catholic Church, and courts have repeatedly found that collective 
282 See id. at 1392.
283 See id. at 1391.
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bargaining is consistent with Church doctrine.288 Indeed, in several cases, the 
courts have observed that the Catholic Church has long supported unionization 
and collective bargaining. According to the Second Circuit in Catholic High 
School Association of the Archdiocese of New York v. Culvert, “the Encyclicals 
and other Papal Messages make clear that the Catholic Church has for nearly a 
century been among the staunchest supporters of the rights of employees to 
organize and engage in collective bargaining.”289  The court continued with the 
additional observation that the Church’s “strong commitment to social and 
economic justice and collective bargaining was recently affirmed in the … 
Catholic Bishops’ Pastoral Letter” on the economy.290 However, a more thorough 
analysis of the Church’s social teaching reveals that the Church’s views are far 
more complicated than these courts assume. While the Church strongly supports 
worker rights and collective bargaining, the Church’s vision of collective 
bargaining is very different from the framework established in the NLRA and 
state labor laws that resemble the federal statute.291
While secular statutes presuppose and entrench an adversarial relationship 
between management and labor, the Catholic Church’s goal is a cooperative 
relationship based on charity, mutual respect and concern, and the common good. 
In an earlier article on religious organizations and mandatory collective 
bargaining, I have discussed differences between the NLRA and the Church’s 
model in great detail and have identified several aspects of the national 
framework that conflict with Church teaching.292 For example, whereas the 
availability, threat and actual use of economic weapons such as strikes and 
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(2nd Cir. 1985); St. Elizabeth Cmty. Hosp. v. NLRB, 708 F.2d 1436, 1442-43 (9th Cir. 1983); Hill-
Murray Fed’n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857, 865 (Minn. 1992).
289 Culvert, 753 F.2d at 1170.
290 Id. at 1170. The court was referring to NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, 
ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: PASTORAL LETTER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S. 
ECONOMY (10th anniversary ed., 1997) (1986). The pastoral letter was in draft form when the 
Culvert opinion  was written. 
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 The first state labor statutes were modeled on the NLRA as originally adopted in 1935. See
CHARLES C. KILLINGSWORTH, STATE LABOR RELATIONS ACTS: A STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY 1-2 
(1948). The original version of the NLRA is commonly referred to as the Wagner Act, and these 
first state statutes are known as “little” or “baby” Wagner Acts. See SANFORD COHEN, STATE 
LABOR LEGISLATION 1937-47: A STUDY OF STATE LAWS AFFECTING THE CONDUCT AND 
ORGANIZATION OF LABOR UNIONS 4 (1948). Later state statutes anticipated the amendments to the 
Wagner Act in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and helped to shape these changes. See
KILLINGSWORTH, supra, at 2-5. For the mutual influence of state and federal labor statutes upon 
one another, see KILLINGSWORTH, supra. 
292 See Brady, supra note XX..
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lockouts is “part and parcel”293 of the system that the NLRA sets up, the Church 
envisions a process of reasoned discussion and cooperation based upon a desire 
for mutual understanding, reconciliation and achievement of the common good.294
In the Church’s view, strikes are permissible as an “extreme”295 or “ultimate”296
means for defending worker rights, but they may never be abused for the purposes 
of narrow self-interest,297 and the parties must “resume negotiations and the 
discussion of reconciliation” as soon as possible.298 Likewise, the National Labor 
Relation Board’s interpretation of the Act to prohibit employer promises and 
grants of benefits made during an election campaign in order to discourage a vote 
for the union also frustrates the Church’s vision.299 Such a prohibition impedes 
the genuine attempts at reconciliation that the Church encourages as well as the 
threatening and misleading gestures feared by the Board.300 Moreover, provisions 
in the Act designed to channel all bilateral dealings over working conditions into 
collective bargaining or other arms-length relationships limit the type of 
collaboration between labor and management that the Church envisions.301
293
 NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960).
294 See Brady, supra note XX, 114-15, 119-122.
295 POPE JOHN PAUL II, LABOREM EXERCENS ¶ 20 (1981), reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL 
THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE 352, 381 (David J. O’Brien & Thomas A. Shannon 
eds., 1992).
296 SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, GAUDIUM ET SPES: PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN 
THE MODERN WORLD ¶ 68 (1965), reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note XX, at 
166, 212.
297 See LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note XX, ¶ 20, at 381; POPE PAUL VI, OCTOGESIMA 
ADVENIENS ¶ 14 (1971), reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note XX, at 265, 270.
298 GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note XX, ¶ 68, at 212.
299 See Brady, supra note XX, at 122-28. The Board has held that such promises and grants of 
benefits violate section 8(a)(1) of the Act. See, e.g., Hudson Hosiery Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 1434, 1436-
37 (1947); see also NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 408-09 (1964) (describing and 
approving Board’s position). Section 8(a)(1) is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2001). 
300
 According to the Board, promises and grants of benefits during an election campaign will 
interfere with employee free choice. In NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., the Supreme Court 
explained that employees will interpret promises or grants of benefits as the equivalent of a threat 
of reprisal should they choose the union. See Exchange Parts, 375 U.S. at 409. In addition, when 
employers make promises or grants of benefits, they are not to be trusted, and any benefits will be 
fleeting. See id. at 410. 
301 See Brady, supra note XX, at 128-38 (discussing section 8(a)(2) of the Act). Section 8(a)(2) of 
the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to “dominate or interfere with the 
formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to 
it.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2001). The Act defines a “labor organization” as “any  organization of 
any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees 
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers 
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of 
work.” Id. § 152(5). The Board has construed the term “dealing with” broadly; covered 
interactions go beyond actual collective bargaining and include any bilateral processes in which 
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Forcing workers and employers into independent camps on opposite sides of the 
bargaining table fosters distrust and division, not the unity that the Church 
seeks.302  Thus, while the Church clearly supports collective bargaining and 
worker rights, courts upholding the application of secular labor statutes to 
Catholic institutions have not recognized the deep differences between the 
Church’s vision and the legal frameworks that they have imposed.
The lessons from these cases go even further. If one examines cases where 
Catholic organizations have objected to mandatory collective bargaining on First 
Amendment grounds, one will not find reference to the differences I have 
described. Church institutions have not argued that the Catholic vision of 
collective bargaining is incompatible with secular regimes. Indeed, in a few cases, 
Catholic institutions had been voluntarily bargaining with unions under secular 
law for years.303 The absence of the type of argument I have sketched may, in 
part, have been strategic. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Catholic Bishop, 
Catholic institutions understandably chose to emphasize the types of issues that
the Court raised in that case. However, in many cases, Catholic employers were 
probably not aware of the differences that I have described. Employers may 
simply not have given the relationship between secular bargaining regimes and 
Catholic social teaching extended examination, or they may have been unfamiliar 
with secular labor statutes and, thus, unaware of potential conflicts. Indeed, in my 
earlier article on religious organizations and mandatory collective bargaining, I 
discuss several cases where Catholic employers unwittingly violated labor statutes 
when following basic principles of Catholic social thought in interactions with 
union members.304 For these employers, the conflicts between secular law and 
Catholic teaching only became apparent as their relationship with union members 
unfolded over time.
employees make proposals to management and these proposals are considered by management. 
See Brady, supra note XX, at 129. 
According to the Board, the purpose of section 8(a)(2) is to ensure that labor 
organizations that deal with management on working conditions are independent of management. 
See id. at 130-31. Section 8(a)(2) is violated whenever an employer dominates, interferes with or 
supports such an organization, such as by creating and structuring the organization. The effect of 
section 8(a)(2) is to funnel all bilateral dealing between employers and employees over working 
conditions into collective bargaining or some other arms-length relationship. See id. at 130-32.
302 See Brady, supra note XX, at 131-32, 135-38.
303 See Catholic High Sch. Ass’n of the Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161, 1163 (2nd
Cir. 1985); see also South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus 
Church Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d 709, 716 (N.J. 1997) (diocese had “past history of collective 
bargaining with lay high-school teachers”).
304 See Brady, supra note XX, at 141-44.
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Thus, courts may have difficulty determining whether government 
regulations burden group beliefs or practices because the religious group itself 
may be unaware of potential conflicts. Conflicts between religious doctrine and 
secular law may exist, but they may not be visible at the outset to either the 
church or the courts. In other cases, courts may be stymied by multiple 
interpretations of church doctrine. There are, for example, Catholic scholars who 
genuinely believe that collective bargaining under federal and state law is 
compatible with the Church’s vision for labor relations.305 They and I disagree 
about the proper interpretation of Catholic social teaching. Sometimes multiple 
interpretations of church doctrine are a sign that the group’s beliefs are changing 
or developing. In either case, there may be no single authoritative view but many 
legitimate positions all of which represent permissible interpretations of existing 
beliefs. Where multiple interpretations of church doctrine exist, any choice among 
them will entangle the courts in religious questions and interfere with the free 
development of doctrine.  Indeed, the fact that religious doctrine is not static but 
develops over time means that government regulation which imposes no burden 
today may do so tomorrow, and views which are unorthodox today or even barely 
articulable may be authoritative tomorrow. It will be difficult for courts to 
recognize and keep up with such changes particularly where new doctrines are in 
the early stages of development or adoption.
Courts may try to address these problems by deferring to the religious 
organization regarding its beliefs and burdens on these beliefs. In theory, courts 
which exercise such deference will not become embroiled in religious questions 
and will give sufficient protection when beliefs or practices are infringed. 
However, while such deference may reduce the difficulties that courts face, it will 
not eliminate them.  As discussed above, religious organizations may not be 
aware of the ways in which government regulation will impede their doctrine and 
practices. Simply deferring to the organization regarding burdens on religious 
exercise will not provide sufficient protection where the organization itself does 
not fully understand the relationship between government regulation and church 
practice. Moreover, when burdens are later experienced after the application of 
secular law, the organization may find it difficult to obtain relief from the courts 
particularly if there has been prior unsuccessful litigation. The reviewing court 
may be tempted to view later complaints as a mere pretext for unwillingness to 
incur the monetary costs of regulation or other intrusions unrelated to religious 
matters. Moreover, because religious doctrine is constantly changing, courts must 
305 See, e.g., David L. Gregory, Government Regulation of Religion Through Labor and 
Employment Discrimination Laws, 22 STETSON L. REV. 27, 67 (1992); David L. Gregory & 
Charles J. Russo, Overcoming NLRB v. Yeshiva University by the Implementation of Catholic 
Labor Theory, 41 LAB. L.J. 55, 63 (1990).
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be willing to recognize new conflicts where none existed previously. Courts may 
be tempted to believe that regulation which is permissible today will be 
permissible tomorrow, but this may not be true. To the extent that courts are slow 
to recognize change, they may impede the free development of doctrine and chill 
the behavior of members and leaders who will understandably hesitate to promote 
changes that will result in prolonged and uncertain litigation.306 Unless courts are 
truly prepared to defer whenever the religious organization claims that 
government regulation interferes with religious belief or doctrine, there is a 
significant chance that judges will become entangled in religious doctrine and 
either miss, or be slow to recognize, substantial burdens. 
These examples from cases involving labor and employment regulation 
illustrate a basic lesson that is repeated over and over again in the Supreme 
Court’s intra-church dispute decisions and yet again in Smith. Courts are not fit to 
interpret religious doctrine and engage in religious questions. As the Court in 
Watson v. Jones observed, where civil courts resolve religious questions, the 
appeal is “from the more learned tribunal … to one which is less so.”307  Thus, 
whether mandatory collective bargaining conflicts with Catholic doctrine is not a 
question which the Second Circuit or any other court is competent to answer. Nor 
are courts competent to measure the burden on religious doctrine when federal 
antidiscrimination laws are applied to the employment policies of conservative 
Christian schools. Judicial inquiry into the centrality of religious beliefs as 
prohibited in Smith is just one impermissible form of entanglement in church 
306
 In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), the Supreme Court recognized that similar concerns about judicial 
misunderstanding may chill the activities of religious organizations. As discussed above, the Court 
in Amos addressed Title VII’s exemption for religious organizations from the statute’s prohibition 
on religious discrimination in employment. See supra text accompanying notes 87-95. While an 
earlier exemption extended only to the organization’s religious activities, the current exemption 
extends to nonreligious activities as well. See id. Those challenging the exemption argued that the 
broader provision cannot be justified as an attempt to alleviate government interference with 
religious practice because the earlier exemption had already provided adequate protection. Amos, 
483 U.S. at 335-36. The Supreme Court disagreed. Id. at 336. According to the Court, “it is a 
significant burden on a religious organization to require it, on pain of substantial liability, to 
predict which of its activities a secular court will consider religious.” Id. The Court pointed out 
that the line between the group’s religious and nonreligious activities “is hardly a bright one” and 
that “an organization might understandably be concerned that a judge would not understand its 
religious tenets and sense of mission.” Id. Were this to happen, “[f]ear of potential liability might 
affect the way an organization carried out what it understood to be its religious mission.” Id. ; see 
also id. at 343-44 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (prospect of litigation and judicial 
misunderstanding “create the danger of chilling religious activity”).
307
 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1872).
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doctrine. The determination of whether government regulation places a burden on 
organizational belief and practice is another.
Indeed, the problem is even more basic. When judges become entangled in 
doctrinal questions involving religious denominations different from their own, 
they lack the concepts and experiences necessary to fully understand what is at 
stake. Faith is not irrational or nonrational as some scholars have suggested, nor is 
it completely impenetrable to outsiders. However, faith sheds a light which allows 
the believer to see things differently and anew. Where judges do not share this 
perspective, they are likely to miss matters of religious or spiritual significance, 
and they will also have difficulty recognizing where their own limitations lie.
Efforts by courts and scholars to carve out special areas of protection for 
quintessentially religious matters are no less problematic. As noted above, courts 
addressing the application of antidiscrimination statutes to religious organizations 
have developed a ministerial exception which protects the church-minister 
relationship from state interference regardless of whether the organization has a 
religious basis for its actions. The church-minister relationship is an area of 
“prime ecclesiastical concern”308 so “close to the heart of the church”309 that the 
state may not interfere even if there is no doctrinal reason for the discrimination. 
Interference in the church-minister relationship, by definition, burdens religious 
practice. Scholars such as Bagni and Esbeck would expand the sphere of special 
protection to include other core religious matters. Bagni’s “spiritual epicenter” 
includes membership policies, religious education, worship and ritual as well as 
the relationship between church and minister.310 For Esbeck, “inherently 
religious” matters also include ecclesiastical polity, church discipline and 
personnel decisions where employees are chosen on the basis of religion.311 For 
Lupu and Tuttle, the protected zone consists of those aspects of religious 
organizations that are “bound up with the sacred”312 and uniquely distinctive from 
the temporal and material concerns of the state.313
At first glance, this approach seems to avoid the concerns raised in Smith. 
If it is possible to identify a set of activities that are inherently or quintessentially 
religious, judges can protect these areas from government interference without 
308
 Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1357 
(D.C. Cir. 1990); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 1972).
309
 Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 1999).
310 See supra text accompanying notes 205-07.
311 See supra text accompanying notes 208-14.
312
 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note XX, at 84.
313 See id. at 92.
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having to engage in religion-specific analyses that would entangle the courts in 
religious doctrine and belief.314 However, there are several difficulties with this 
approach. First, the aspects of church life which are uniquely or quintessentially 
religious are not obvious. Courts may readily agree that the selection of clergy 
belongs within this protected zone and probably worship and ritual as well, but 
there will surely be disagreement about what other matters merit special 
protection. For example, while Esbeck has identified church discipline as an 
inherently religious matter,315 the Ninth Circuit recently refused to extend the 
same protection to disciplinary matters, even decisions regarding clergy. In 
Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus,316 the Ninth Circuit 
addressed a sexual harassment claim by a Jesuit seminarian under Title VII.317
The seminarian alleged that he had been sexually harassed on several occasions 
by his superiors, and that when he reported the harassment, the order did nothing 
about it.318 The court allowed the claim and distinguished disciplinary decisions 
regarding clergy from the selection of clergy.319 At least where the church does 
not offer a religious reason for the harassment, the court found that “it stray[ed[ 
too far from the rationale of the Free Exercise Clause to extend constitutional 
protection to this sort of disciplinary inaction simply because a minister is the 
target as well as the agent of the harassing activity.”320 Other courts disagree. For 
example, in Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, the Maine Supreme 
Court held that “[p]astoral supervision” is an “ecclesiastical prerogative.”321 The 
litigation in Swanson involved a claim against a Catholic diocese for negligent 
supervision of a priest who had engaged in sexual misconduct during marital 
counseling.322 The court held that the claim violated the Free Exercise Clause 
because the imposition of secular tort standards on the church’s relationship with 
314
 Indeed, Lupu and Tuttle have defended their approach on this ground.  Citing Smith, Lupu and 
Tuttle argue that the protected aspects of religious organizations “cannot rest upon the subjective 
perceptions of the governed concerning what constitutes the inviolable core of their faith.” Id. at 
83. The majority in Smith recognized that “issues of what lies, or does not lie, at the centrality of 
faith for particular believers is beyond judicial competence.” Id. Instead, Lupu and Tuttle begin 
with a “political concept of religion,” id., and define protected matters as those which relate to the 
“world beyond the temporal and material concerns that are the proper jurisdiction of the state,” id. 
at  92.
315 See Esbeck, supra note XX, at 308 (Notre Dame); Esbeck, supra note XX, at 44-45 (Iowa); 
Esbeck, supra note XX, at 397, 420 (W&L).
316
 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999).
317 See Bollard, 196 F.3d at 944.
318 See id. at 944.
319 See id. at 946-47.
320 Id. at 947.
321
 Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441, 445 (Me. 1997).
322 See id. at 442.
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its ministers interferes with “denominational governance.”323 Thus, in many cases 
it will not be easy to get agreement among courts about which aspects of church 
life should be specially protected, and when there is controversy and uncertainty, 
courts will almost certainly get drawn into examination of religious beliefs and 
practice.
Another difficulty is that the aspects of church administration which are 
quintessentially religious differ from group to group. There is, in fact, no single 
category of church functions which are of prime importance in all traditions. 
Different religious traditions lodge their core religious functions in different 
places, and sensitivity to the diversity of America’s religious traditions would 
involve courts in the type of religion-specific inquiry prohibited in Smith. This 
problem is illustrated well by federal court decisions applying the ministerial 
exception in employment discrimination cases. Courts employing this exception 
envision the role of the minister in the church as of supreme religious importance. 
The minister is the “lifeblood”324 of the church and at the “heart of church 
administration.”325 While this special status may seem obvious to many in 
mainline denominations, it does not fit well with churches that either have no 
ministers at all or where the category of minister goes well beyond a select group 
of church leaders. For example, in EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological 
Seminary,326 the seminary viewed its faculty and administrative staff as 
ministers.327 The Fifth Circuit agreed that the seminary’s faculty should be 
considered ministers,328 but refused to extend the ministerial exception to include 
the staff.329 According to the court, the seminary’s administrative staff do not 
perform traditional ecclesiastical functions.330 While the seminary’s designation 
of its staff as ministers reflected its belief that they played a critical role in the 
school’s religious mission, the court did not attach the same importance to their 
jobs. The court was working with a much narrower conception of minister than 
the seminary.
323 Id. at 445.
324
 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972); see also Gellington v. Christian 
Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 2000) (same); Bollard, 196 F.3d at 
946 (same); Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 
1357 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (same).
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 Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1368 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975).
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 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981).
327 See Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 285.
328 See id. at 283-84.
329 See id. at 285.
330 See id. at 284-85.
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Likewise, when teachers in the Christian school operated by the 
Shenandoah Baptist Church identified themselves as ministers, the Fourth Circuit 
rejected their characterization and distinguished them from “pastoral staff,” 
employees with “sacerdotal functions” and “church governors.”331 While the 
teachers in this case taught from a pervasively religious perspective,332 viewed 
their jobs as a “personal ministry,”333 and were employed at an institution that 
played a critical role in the church’s evangelizing mission,334 the Fourth Circuit 
had a much different picture of the clergy role. Schools like Southwestern Baptist 
Theological Seminary and the elementary and secondary school operated by 
Shenandoah Baptist Church reflect a common belief about ministry in evangelical 
Protestant communities. For evangelical Protestants, all church members who use 
their gifts to serve the religious mission of the church play a ministerial role. The 
roots of this doctrine go back to the Reformation’s insistence upon “the 
priesthood of all believers.” Within this evangelical perspective, protecting only 
ordained clergy or employees whose role is similar to those who have been 
ordained misunderstands basic church polity. All members who serve the church 
are its lifeblood; all play an essential role in its religious mission.
To be sure, federal courts have been careful to expand the category of 
minister beyond ordained clergy to others who perform ministerial functions. 
Many courts have adopted the definition suggested by Bruce Bagni and include 
any employee whose “primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, 
church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or 
participation in religious ritual and worship.”335 This inquiry is designed to 
“determine whether a position is important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of 
the church.”336 However, Bagni’s definition is still relatively narrow and reflects a 
familiar, but by no means universal view, of ministers as employees with 
leadership or worship roles, or direct responsibilities for the spread of the 
church’s message. The administrative staff at Southwestern Baptist Theological 
Seminary would not be included even if their work is essential to the success of 
the institution’s religious mission. Nor would other employees who serve 
religious organizations in nonsupervisory and nonteaching roles. 
331
 Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1396 (4th Cir. 1990).
332 See id. at 1396.
333 Id. at 1396.
334 See id. at 1391-92.
335
 Bagni, supra note XX, at 1545, quoted in EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 
F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 2000); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1996); 
Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985); 
Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343, 1347 (D. Colo. 1994).
336 Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169; see also Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 801 (quoting Rayburn); Catholic 
Univ., 83 F.3d at 461 (quoting Rayburn).
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Such a narrow understanding of essential ecclesiastical functions is also 
incompatible with Roman Catholic polity. While the Catholic Church is one of 
the most hierarchical of all Christian denominations, the Church does not limit 
essential religious functions to ordained clergy or those with similar leadership, 
teaching or worship roles. For example, in the Church’s social mission, those who 
feed and counsel the needy also proclaim the Church’s message just as much as 
do preachers from the pulpit. For many scholars, the social services activities of 
religious organizations are viewed as less purely or quintessentially religious than 
teaching and worship. For example, Bagni places social services operations 
outside the spiritual epicenter and closer to the secular world than core religious 
functions.337 Esbeck has also described social services activities as a “second tier 
of religious ministry” that is “more the outgrowth of truths held by religious faiths 
than they are centrally dealing with the particulars of one’s perception of ultimate 
truth.”338 For the Catholic Church, this is a misunderstanding of the Christian 
message. When Christ reveals God’s love for humanity on the cross, he invites 
others to share in his life by imitating this love.339 Serving the poor and needy is 
not a second tier expression of one’s faith. It is part and parcel of the Gospel 
message. Indeed, it is the Christian message in deed as well as word. When 
church members serve their neighbors in need, they follow, model and witness the 
love of God. Thus, within the work of the counselor, the administrator and even 
the cook there is the essence of the Church’s teaching.340
337 See Bagni, supra note XX, at 1539-40.
338
 Esbeck, supra note XX, at 377. (W&L)
In its recent decision in Catholic Charities of Sacramento v. Superior Court, No. 
S099822, 2004 WL 370295 (Cal. Mar. 1, 2004), the California Supreme Court went much further 
and found that the relationship between a Catholic social services agency and its employees, many 
of whom were non-Catholics, was not a matter of internal church governance protected under the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s intrachurch dispute precedents.  Id. at *3-4. The court distinguished 
Catholic Charities of Sacramento from a church and described it as a “nonprofit public benefit 
corporation.” Id. at *4. While lower courts in the labor and employment area have routinely 
described the operations of religiously-affiliated social services agencies as essentially secular, 
they have not suggested that these organizations fall outside the ambit of the Court’s intrachurch 
dispute cases.
339 See Kathleen A. Brady, Catholic Social Thought and the Public Square: Deconstructing the 
Demand for Public Accessibility, 1 VILL. J. CATHOLIC SOC. THOUGHT (forthcoming 2004).
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 According to the California Supreme Court in Catholic Charities, Catholic Charities 
acknowledged in its complaint that “[t]he corporate purpose of [the organization] is not the direct 
inculcation of religious values.” Catholic Charities, 2004 WL 370295, at *2. See supra note 338 
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compassionate society” which supports human dignity. Catholic Charities, 2004 WL 370295, at 
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Even if the ministerial exception is appropriately limited to leadership, 
worship and teaching roles, the courts have had difficulty in expanding their 
vision beyond familiar clergy jobs to include all employees with primary 
responsibilities for teaching the church’s message. If one examines the outcomes 
of federal circuit court opinions involving the ministerial exception, one will find 
that the courts have not strayed far from traditional clerical positions. Employees 
identified as ministerial have included ordained clergy,341 seminary faculty,342 a 
pastoral associate,343 a diocesan communications manager,344 a professor of canon 
law at a Catholic university,345 and music directors and teachers.346 Excluded 
from the ministerial exception have been faculty at a pervasively religious 
Christian college347 and lay teachers in church-operated elementary and secondary 
schools.348 Indeed, except for theology and music teachers,349 no federal court has 
included lay teachers at religiously affiliated schools within the ministerial 
*2. Moreover, the fact that Catholic Charities has invited non-Catholics to join its work and 
receive its services does not undermine this religious purpose or its expression of the Catholic 
faith. According to the California court, the relationship between Catholic Charities and its 
employees, “most of whom do not belong to the Catholic Church,” is not an internal church 
matter. Id. at *4. The court misunderstands. While Catholic Charities has invited non-Catholics to 
share in its religious mission, it retains the authority to decide what this mission is and to ensure 
that all relationships within the organization appropriately reflect its religious values. 
341 See Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2000); 
Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 
1999); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991); Minker 
v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990); 
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972); cf. Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of 
United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994) (probationary minister).
342 See EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981).
343 See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985).
344 See Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003).
345 SeeEEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
346 See EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000) (music director 
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347 See EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980).
348 See Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324 (3rd Cir. 1993); 
DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 (2nd Cir. 1993); Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist 
Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 
1986). 
349
 In Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Colo. 1994), a federal district court held that a 
theology teacher at a Catholic school is covered by the ministerial exception. In Raleigh, the 
Fourth Circuit found that a music teacher at a Catholic school functioned as a minister. Raleigh, 
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See e.g., Sabatino v. Saint Aloysius Parish, 672 A.2d 217 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996); Pardue 
v. Ctr. City Consortium Sch. Of the Archdiocese of Wash., No. 02-5459, 2003 WL 21753776 
(Super. Ct. D.C., Civil Div. July 29, 2003).
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exception.350 In its landmark Establishment Clause decision in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, the Supreme Court found that lay teachers in parochial schools play a 
critical role in disseminating religious beliefs and doctrine and that religion is 
intertwined with secular instruction.351 The Court in Catholic Bishop repeated 
these observations.352 Nevertheless, lower courts applying the ministerial 
exception have largely bypassed these precedents as they have concluded that the 
educational responsibilities of lay teachers are not sufficiently religious to qualify 
them as ministers.
The difficulty with any judicial or scholarly line-drawing between core 
religious matters and less sensitive functions goes even further. For some 
denominations, there is simply no line that can be drawn between religious and 
nonreligious functions. Everything that goes on within the organization is 
suffused with religious significance. Where the outsider sees routine or secular 
matters, the church members see important religious activity. Again, the Catholic 
Church provides a good example. In state and lower federal court cases upholding 
the application of labor statutes to religiously affiliated social services programs 
and schools, the courts have been confident that collective bargaining 
requirements will not interfere with religious practice. According to the courts, 
because religiously affiliated social services organizations function just like 
nonreligious charitable enterprises and are essentially secular in their operations, 
any intrusion on religious matters will be minimal.353 In the context of church-
operated schools, the courts have held that interference with religious matters can 
be avoided if bargaining is limited to wages, hours and other secular terms of 
employment.354 However, where Catholic organizations are involved, such a 
division between secular and religious activities is not possible. For the Church, 
the entire inner life of the religious community must model and witness the 
Gospel principles of charity, cooperation and mutual concern.355 The Church and 
its institutions are to be an example and instrument of a new kind of social life 
built upon the love of Christ and unifying all persons with God and one 
350 But see Gabriel v. Immanuel Evangelical Lutheran Church, 640 N.E.2d 681 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1994). In Gabriel, a lower state court addressed a claim for breach of contract brought by a 
kindergarten teacher against a church-operated school, and the court held that the teacher was a 
ministerial employee whose employment was an ecclesiastical issue into which civil courts could 
not intervene. I have found no other case, state or federal, which has held that lay teachers in 
church-operated schools fall within the ministerial exception or otherwise qualify as ministerial 
employees.
351 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616-19 (1971).
352 See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 501-03 (1979).
353 See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
354 See supra notes 163, 168 and accompanying text.
355 See Brady, supra note XX, at 112-13; Brady, supra note XX, at ___ (forthcoming 2004).
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another.356 Thus, while the operations of Catholic social services organizations 
may appear to be essentially secular, they are, in fact, suffused with religious 
significance. Not only are the activities of service programs a response to and 
imitation of God’s love demonstrated on the cross, but the very internal life and 
social relations within the community are a sign and witness of this love. Catholic 
communities proclaim the Gospel message through their work and their 
communal life. Justice Brennan recognized the quintessentially religious character 
of such social services programs in his concurrence in Amos. According to 
Brennan, “[c]hurches often regard the provision of such services as a means of 
fulfilling religious duty and of providing an example of the way of life a church 
seeks to foster.”357 For the Catholic Church, social services activities are no more 
secular than worship and preaching. 
Nor will limiting collective bargaining to wages, hours and other secular 
terms of employment solve the problem. In labor-management relations, like all 
social relations, the Church seeks collaboration and cooperation and rejects 
adversarialism. Requiring the Church to bargain under secular bargaining regimes 
that presuppose and entrench an adversarial relationship between labor and 
management will undermine the Church’s ability to live out its religious beliefs. 
Even if bargaining is limited to secular terms of employment, the process of 
bargaining under secular regimes remains incompatible with the church’s doctrine 
and practice. Where all the relationships within a religious organization are 
suffused with religious significance as in the Catholic context, disentangling the 
secular from the religious is simply not possible.
Thus, the only effective and workable protection for the ability of religious 
groups to preserve, transmit and develop their beliefs free from government 
interference is a broad right of church autonomy that extends to all aspects of 
church affairs. While in theory it may be preferable to grant relief only in 
situations where religious doctrine or practice is actually burdened, Smith
prohibits the type of judicial inquiry that such an approach would require, and 
existing case law demonstrates that judges are not able to identify such burdens 
accurately. Line-drawing between quintessentially religious activities and 
activities that are less critical to the religious mission is similarly problematic. It is 
by no means clear where such a line should be drawn, and, moreover, there is no 
single line that fits all religious organizations. For some organizations, like the 
Catholic Church, no such line exists at all. Thus, the only approach to government 
regulation of religious groups that is fully consistent with the lessons in Smith is a 
356 See Brady, supra note XX, at 112-13; Brady, supra note XX, at ____ (forthcoming 2004).
357
 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 344 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
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right of autonomy that extends to all matters of church administration, not just 
those with core religious significance and not just those that are demonstrably 
burdened by the state.
C. Religious Belief and Democratic Government
At this point, the reader might object to the direction of my argument.
If limiting relief to identifiable burdens on religious belief and practice is not 
possible and no line can be drawn between quintessentially religious matters and 
less significant practices, the lesson of Smith is to abandon special protections for 
religious groups altogether. The Smith Court reached that conclusion in the 
context of individual religious exercise when it found that judges were unfit to 
determine when government action burdens practices central for individual 
believers. Why should the outcome be different with respect to religious groups? I 
have argued above that full freedom of religious belief requires at least some 
special protections for groups, but perhaps that was the wrong starting point. After 
all, Smith does not guarantee a diversity of religious perspectives or that religious 
belief will be unaffected by government action. Smith states that government may 
not regulate beliefs as such, but the decision requires nothing further. The Smith
Court may envision a world of diverse religious beliefs unimpeded by 
government action, but it did nothing to ensure such an environment. Moreover, 
while it might be desirable, in the abstract, to provide strong protections for 
religious belief and the groups that shape and sustain belief, there are 
countervailing state policies at stake when neutral laws of general applicability 
are involved. At this point, the reader should recall Ira Lupu’s observation that the 
internal affairs of religious groups can have substantial effects upon the larger 
society, sometimes quite negative, and, thus, the state has important interests in 
extending neutral regulation to religious groups.358 While the internal affairs of 
religious groups may not affect the external affairs of the larger community 
directly, they often do so indirectly. When religious organizations shape attitudes, 
moral convictions and behavior in the larger society, as they frequently do, what 
goes on within the organizations has important consequences for those outside the 
group.359 A broad right of church autonomy provides little protection when these 
consequences are harmful, and the religious organization prevails even in 
situations where there is no burden on religious belief and practice. Why should 
protections for religious belief necessarily trump countervailing state policies 
except in narrow cases where the group’s behavior directly harms outsiders? 
Perhaps, the readiness of lower courts to find compelling state interests when 
employment and labor laws burden group belief and practice reflects an important 
358 See Lupu, supra note XX, at 408-09.
359 See id. at 408-09.
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reality that supporters of a broad right of church autonomy ignore.  Church 
autonomy comes at a cost, and given this cost, why is such a right desirable?
On this question as well, Smith provides important guidance. In the 
framework that Smith establishes for individual religious exercise, democratic 
processes play the central role in protecting religious liberty. The Free Exercise 
Clause does not guarantee relief where individual practice is burdened by neutral 
state action, but citizens can and, when reasonable, should extend such protection 
though legislative accommodations.
The faith that Smith places in democratic government invites consideration 
of the conditions that are necessary for its flourishing. If strong protections for 
individual religious belief and the groups that nurture and sustain belief are 
critical for successful democratic government, a broad right of church autonomy 
should certainly be preferred over the alternative of no special protections at all. 
Many scholars in recent years have emphasized the importance of religious 
groups and other voluntary associations for sustaining a well-functioning 
democratic order. Religious groups are among the “mediating structures” or 
institutions of “civil society” that stand between the individual and the state and 
transmit the values, skills and attitudes necessary for self-government.360 As the 
source of moral values, they function as “seedbeds of civic virtue.”361 As training 
grounds for the exercise of democratic skills and responsibilities, they are 
“schools of democracy.”362 However, for many scholars who have emphasized the 
importance of associational life in the democratic order, this critical role does not 
call for strong protections against state interference. To the contrary, the state has 
an important role in shaping the internal affairs of religious and other civic groups 
so that they are congruent with democratic norms and shared public values.363
360
 Peter Berger and Richard John Neuhaus popularized the term “mediating structures.” PETER L. 
BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: FROM STATE TO CIVIL SOCIETY 158 
(Michael Novak ed., 2d ed. 1996). The term “civil society” is also very common in recent 
literature. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Foreword: Legal and Constitutional 
Implications of the Calls to Revive Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 289, 289 (2000).
361 See e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE 109 (1991); Linda C. McLain & James E. Fleming, Some Questions for Civil Society-
Revivalists, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301, 309-10 (2000); Yael Tamir, Revisiting the Civic Sphere, in
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 214, 218 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998); see also SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE: 
SOURCES OF COMPETENCE, CHARACTER, AND CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (Mary Ann 
Glendon & David Blankenhorn eds., 1995).
362 BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note XX, at 194; see also McClain & Fleming, Some Questions, 
supra note XX, at 309-11; Tamir, supra note XX, at 218.
363
 As Amy Gutmann has written: 
A government that is constitutionally dedicated to liberal democratic principles 
has a strong interest in supporting a vast assortment of associational activities 
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These scholars fear minority groups who teach “illiberal” values that will 
destabilize rather than strengthen democratic government.364 Too much diversity 
in associational life is not a good thing when this diversity undermines our 
common civic culture.365
For those who desire congruence between the internal affairs of civil 
society institutions and shared public values, full freedom of religious belief is not 
desirable nor are strong protections for religious group autonomy. These scholars 
do not want to “bend over backwards” to protect minority religious groups from 
state interference where these groups do not support common civic values.366 Like 
Lupu, they emphasize the ways in which the internal affairs of religious groups 
can have harmful effects on the larger society, and rather than broad autonomy, 
they welcome regulation that shapes, molds and constitutes religious and other 
groups according to shared public values. A number of legal scholars who have 
written about religious group rights in the context of labor and employment laws 
share this position. Pointing to the role that religious groups play in shaping 
culture and transmitting values,367 these scholars have argued that employment 
discrimination within religious organizations threatens a “culture of 
among its citizens. But it also has a strong interest in regulating associations so 
that they support a liberal democratic form of government and public policies 
that are consistent with liberal democratic principles. 
Amy Gutmann, Freedom of Association: An Introductory Essay, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, 
supra note XX, at 3, 18; see also STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC 
EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 108, 151, 134-35, 277 (2000); Stephen Macedo, 
The Constitution, Civic Virtue, and Civil Society: Social Capital as Substantive Morality, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1573, 1573-74, 1592-93 (2001) [hereinafter Macedo, The Constitution, Civic 
Virtue, and Civil Society]; Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil Society: School Vouchers, 
Religious Nonprofit Organizations, and Liberal Public Values, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 417, 428, 
432, 440-41, 451 (2000) [hereinafter Macedo, Constituting Civil Society]; Joshua Cohen & Joel 
Rogers, Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance, 20 POL. & SOC’Y 393, 394-95 
(1992). For discussions of scholarship advocating this position, see NANCY ROSENBLUM, 
MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM IN AMERICA 36-41 (1998), and 
Tamir, supra note XX, at 220-22. Both Rosenblum and Tamir disagree with those who favor using 
the power of the state to achieve a congruence between the internal values of groups and public 
values. See ROSENBLUM, supra, at 47-65, 349-50; Tamir, supra note XX, at 215, 222-26. For 
others criticizing the demand for congruence, see William A. Galston, Civil Society, Civic Virtue, 
and Liberal Democracy, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 603, 604-05 (2000).
364 See MACEDO, supra note XX, at 197; see also Tamir, supra note XX, at 222 (discussing such 
fear).
365 See MACEDO, supra note XX, at 2, 34, 134-35, 146-47, 219.
366 MACEDO, supra note XX, at 147, 197.
367 See Brant, supra note XX, at 277-78; Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional 
Value: The Case for Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 
1049, 1091-93, 1114 (1996).
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subordination” that harms outsiders as well as members.368 Discrimination by 
religious institutions “send[s] a powerful social message”369 and “imbeds … 
prejudice in American culture.”370 Labor conflicts, particularly in educational 
institutions, also impart the wrong values.371 The state’s interest in enforcing labor 
and employment regulation is, therefore, very strong.372 The Fifth Circuit in 
EEOC v. Mississippi College373 summarized this view well when it held that the 
state’s interest in eradicating discrimination justified application of Title VII to 
faculty positions at a pervasively religious Christian college.374 According to the 
court,
Although the number of religious educational institutions is minute 
in comparison to the number of employers subject to Title VII, 
their effect upon society at large is great because of the role they 
play in educating society’s young. If the environment in which 
such institutions seek to achieve their religious and educational 
goals reflects unlawful discrimination, those discriminatory 
attitudes will be perpetuated with an influential segment of society, 
the detrimental effect of which cannot be estimated.375
All of these scholars misunderstand the proper relationship between 
religious groups and democratic government. Democratic government is not 
supported best by homogeneity of beliefs and values, even beliefs whose 
correctness seems unassailable and values which seem essential for democratic 
life. Shaping associational life so that the internal practices and values of religious 
groups and other mediating institutions match shared public norms stifles new 
ideas that could challenge prevailing perspectives in progressive directions. 
Where government regulation inhibits the preservation, transmission and 
development of minority beliefs within religious communities and other civic 
groups, it disserves democracy, not serves it. Full freedom of belief, even 
unpopular and unorthodox belief, is essential to the health of democratic society 
as are the groups that make such beliefs possible. If democratic majorities were 
permitted to entrench prevailing values by intruding upon the internal practices of 
368
 Rutherford, supra note XX, at 1123, 1114.
369
 Brant, supra note XX, at 277.
370
 Rutherford, supra note XX, at 1091.
371 See Evelyn M. Tenenbaum, The Application of Labor Relations and Discrimination Statutes to 
Lay Teachers at Religious Schools: The Establishment Clause and the Pretext Inquiry, 64 ALB. L. 
REV. 629, 671, 674 (2000).
372 See Brant, supra note XX, at 278, Rutherford, supra note XX, at 1116, 1121-23; Tenenbaum, 
supra note XX, at 671, 673-74.
373
 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980).
374 See Mississippi, 626 F.2d at 488-89.
375 Id. at 489.
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institutions that promote alternative views, improvements in the status quo would 
be difficult to make and errors would go unchallenged. Without unorthodox ideas, 
society will stagnate. The dangers are especially grave when democratic 
majorities are given primary responsibility for protecting individual liberties as 
they are in Smith. While it may be preferable in theory to protect only positive 
alternatives and new ideas that are helpful rather than harmful, humility requires 
us to admit that we do not always know where today’s errors lie or where 
tomorrow’s advances are hidden.
A number of other scholars have also defended the importance of religious 
group freedom in a democratic society. Religious groups and other civic 
associations are buffers against overweening state power.376 Religious groups 
enhance individual autonomy by providing the context for personal development 
and expression.377 Religious groups can also provide a realm or privacy, intimacy 
and supportive social bonds.378 In addition, religious groups mark the limits of 
state jurisdiction by addressing spiritual matters that lie beyond the temporal 
concerns of government.379
My view goes further. Religious groups do not just check the power of the 
state, provide a context for individual development and communal support, or 
address extratemporal matters. Nor do they simply transmit important values and 
skills essential for democratic self-government though they certainly do play all 
of these roles. Rather, for many religious groups, spiritual matters have much to 
say about the shape of the temporal order. Religious communities with prophetic 
traditions speak to the state and its citizens about the content of laws, the 
distribution of wealth and power, and the requirements of justice. Gerard Bradley 
has written that “[i]t is precisely the lot of a church to live by norms unsuited to 
organize a polity acting in history.”380 This is only partly true. Of course, no 
political system can mirror the relationships and structures appropriate within a 
church. However, for many religious traditions, including the Catholic tradition 
discussed above, the norms of the church are viewed as a guide for the norms of 
politics. The Catholic Church, as I observed, views its own internal life as a 
376 See Esbeck, supra note XX, at 53, 67-68 (Iowa); Garnett, supra note XX, at 1853; Gedicks, 
supra note XX, at 115, 158 (Wisc); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note XX, at 40, 84.
377 See Gedicks, supra note XX, at 115-16, 158 (Wisc); see also Tamir, supra note XX, at 215.
378 See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note XX, at 1311-13; Galston, supra note XX, at 604; Ronald R. 
Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001, 1072-75 
(1983); Tamir, supra note XX, at 215.
379 See Gerard V. Bradley, Church Autonomy in the Constitutional Order: The End of Church and 
State?, 49 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1084-87 (1989); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note XX, at 40, 92, 84; Smith, 
supra note XX, at 1017-18.
380
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model for social relationships in the larger community, including relationships 
between labor and management. For the Catholic Church, the cooperative vision 
of collective bargaining that it advocates is not intended solely for its own 
institutions. To the contrary, it promotes this vision as the standard that should 
guide political decision makers and commercial actors as well. Indeed, the 
Church’s contemporary teaching on social issues began with a document designed 
to address the desperate condition of the working classes and the clash between 
capital and labor at the height of the industrial revolution.381 The Church believes 
that only the Gospel message can provide the “genuine solution” to these and 
other social problems.382 Indeed, “the new command of love” displayed on the 
cross, modeled in the communal life of the church, and imitated in the Church’s 
works of mercy is not only “the basic law of human perfection” but also “of the 
world’s transformation.”383 The Church looks forward to a renewed social order 
which reflects384 and foreshadows385 the kingdom of God.
Indeed, it is activist religious traditions such as these that have contributed 
much to the development of America’s political culture over the course of its 
history. Judge John Noonan has observed that religious crusades played an 
indispensable role in ending slavery and in the fight for civil rights a century 
later.386 Nothing guarantees that religious crusades will be for the good, writes 
Judge Noonan.387 Nor have any succeeded without conflict.388 However, much 
would have been lost without their contributions to the formation of American 
civic culture and political values. Though the ideals of religious crusades were at 
one time unpopular and unorthodox, and even abhorrent to many,389 many were, 
in fact, seeds of progress.
381
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387 See id. at 250.
388 See id. at 258-60.
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Thus, democratic government flourishes best when religious communities 
are free to develop, teach and practice their religious beliefs and doctrines without 
government interference no matter how unpopular or even repugnant their ideas 
may seem. The alternative perspectives and ways of life that religious groups 
communicate and model are the source of new ideas that make change and 
progress possible. Diversity of religious belief and associational life are good 
things in a democracy, and they would not be possible without strong protections 
for religious groups. Lupu and others are correct to point out that religious groups 
play an important role in shaping the larger public culture and values. It is for this 
reason that these groups must be protected from state interference rather than 
molded according to majoritarian values. Anything else would be short-sighted 
and harmful not only to the religious community but also to the larger society.
At this point the reader might raise a further concern. I may have 
demonstrated that strong protections for religious belief and the groups that 
nourish these beliefs are important for democratic self-government, but my 
argument applies equally well to nonreligious associations. Just like religious 
groups, nonreligious organizations may advocate and model new perspectives for 
social and political life. Why, then, the reader may ask, should religious groups 
receive greater protection from government interference than nonreligious groups 
enjoy? Indeed, as I observed above, many scholars in recent years have 
questioned the fairness of special protections for religious organizations. If 
religious and nonreligious groups both provide important benefits to individuals 
and society, why should religious groups receive more favorable treatment?390
The proper response to this concern is not to diminish protections for 
religious organizations but expand them for secular associations that play similar 
roles in the lives of individuals and the larger community. Currently, the right of 
association under the Speech Clause provides considerable protections for groups 
that engage in expressive activities, including the transmission of values.391 The 
Supreme Court has consistently stated that where a law interferes with the internal 
structures or affairs of expressive associations and, as a result, significantly 
impairs the ability of the group to advocate its chosen message, the First 
Amendment requires relief unless application of the law is justified by a 
390 See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note XX, at 1283; Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free Exercise 
Doctrine, supra note XX, at 926-27; Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation, supra note XX, at 574; 
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note XX, at 39-40, 67-68 (describing this position).
391 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648-50 (2000); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 
468 U.S. 609, 622-23 (1984). The Supreme Court precedent also provides strong protections for 
“intimate” associations that provide supportive contexts for personal development and social 
bonds. See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 617-20. 
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compelling state interest.392 According to the court, government interference need 
not be intentional to violate the Constitution.393 In either case, protections are 
necessary to “preserve[e] political and cultural diversity”394 and to prevent the 
majority from “imposing its views on groups that would rather express other, 
perhaps unpopular, ideas.”395 While most of the Court’s decisions have dealt with 
laws affecting membership and leadership choices,396 impermissible intrusions on 
internal affairs may take other forms as well. Regulation of leadership or 
membership decisions is just an “example,” though a “clear[]” example, of 
unconstitutional interference.397
The protection that nonreligious groups currently receive under the right 
of association is considerable, but it is not as expansive as the broad right of 
autonomy that I have defended for religious organizations. Indeed, the Court’s 
approach to the right of association strongly resembles the more moderate option 
for religious group rights that I have rejected above as unworkable. Just as 
religious groups under this option receive relief from government regulation only 
when the regulation burdens religious belief or practice, expressive associations 
are currently entitled to exemptions from government regulation only when it 
significantly affects or alters the group’s message.
In my view, a broad right of autonomy should be extended to nonreligious 
associations where possible. Just as religious groups play an important role in 
democratic government, so do nonreligious associations with expressive purposes. 
Moreover, some of the same problems that make limiting relief to actual burdens 
unworkable in the religious context also arise where the group’s beliefs are 
nonreligious. Under the Court’s current approach to freedom of association, 
judges must determine when government action significantly impairs or alters the 
group’s message. Unfamiliarity with the message and the temptation to reach 
desirable results can lead to misunderstanding and error in a secular context just 
as in a religious one.
392 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 648; Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 622-23.
393 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958).
394 Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 622.
395 Dale, 530 U.S. at 647-48.
396 See Dale, 530 U.S. 640; N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Bd. of 
Directors of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609.
397 Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 623; see also Dale, 530 U.S. at 648 (“Government actions that may 
unconstitutionally burden this freedom may take many forms, one of which is ‘intrusion into the 
internal structure or affairs of an association’ like a ‘regulation that forces the group to accept 
members it does not desire.’”) (quoting Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 623).
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The Court’s recent decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale398 illustrates 
these dangers well. In Dale, the Boy Scouts sought exemption from a New Jersey 
statute prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation in places of public 
association.399 The litigation in Dale arose when the Boy Scouts revoked the adult 
membership of James Dale, an openly homosexual assistant scoutmaster.400 The 
Boy Scouts argued that Dale’s readmittance would interfere with its expression 
because homosexual conduct is not consistent with the values it seeks to teach 
young people.401 The majority gave deference to the Boy Scouts’ description of 
its message and its views about what would impair this message,402 and concluded 
that application of the law would violate the group’s associational rights.403 Four 
justices, led by Justice Stevens, dissented and strongly disagreed with the 
majority’s conclusion and its deference to the Boy Scouts’ claims.404 According to 
the dissent, the majority should have engaged in an “independent analysis” of the 
group’s message and the burden imposed by the New Jersey law,405 and it should 
have required the Boy Scouts to demonstrate a “clear, unequivocal” position 
regarding homosexuality.406 Delving into the Boy Scouts’ internal and public 
statements regarding homosexuality in great detail, the dissent found no clear, 
shared stance regarding homosexuality.407 To the contrary, the dissent found it 
“exceptionally clear” that the Boy Scouts did not have a shared message 
disapproving of homosexuality.408
The dissenting opinion in Dale is a masterful deconstruction of the Boy 
Scouts’ argument. Turning the Boy Scouts’ statements against one another, the 
dissent goes far in undermining the Boy Scouts’ description of its own beliefs and 
in convincing the reader that the Boy Scouts does not really endorse the position 
that the group has adopted consistently since 1978 and advocated publicly in 
litigation and other settings.409 The dissent’s opinion is as troubling as it is 
brilliant. Giving no deference to the association’s assertions regarding its own 
beliefs and expression, the dissenting justices essentially turn the Boy Scouts’ 
398
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position on its head, and one is left wondering whether the justices’ true 
motivation was reaching a desirable result. The majority stops short of making 
such an accusation, but the suggestion lies just beneath the surface. Criticizing the 
New Jersey Supreme Court for reaching the same conclusion as the dissent, the 
Court stated that “it is not the role of the courts to reject a group’s expressed
values because they disagree with those values or find them internally 
inconsistent.”410 We must not, the majority later cautions, be “guided by our 
views of whether the Boy Scouts’ teachings with respect to homosexual conduct 
are right or wrong; public or judicial disapproval of a tenet of an organization’s 
expression does not justify the State’s effort to compel the organization to accept 
members where such acceptance would derogate from the organization’s 
expressive message.”411 Regardless of whether the dissent did succumb to that 
temptation, the danger was clearly present, and the dissent’s claim that its 
conclusions were “exceptionally clear” was certainly wrong. The disagreement 
between the majority and dissent in this case demonstrates that it is not always 
easy for judges to interpret the messages of expressive associations or ascertain 
when government action burdens those messages. This is especially so where the 
group’s beliefs are uncommon or unpopular, not fully logical or coherent, in the 
process of development, or otherwise lacking the clarity and consistency that the 
dissent would like to see. The deference that the majority supports would be 
helpful, but opportunities for misunderstanding will remain as well as temptations 
to misconstrue. When mistakes are made, the costs are high for both the group 
and the larger society. When government suppresses or alters the messages of its 
expressive associations, the diversity of voices in the community is diminished.
How far protections for group autonomy should extend under the right of 
association is a more difficult issue. Special problems arise in the context of 
nonreligious associations that are not present in the case of religious 
organizations. Except in the rare case where a religious organization operates a 
commercial enterprise,412 most, if not all, of the activities of religious groups are 
bound up with First Amendment purposes. By contrast, the range of nonreligious 
associations that engage in some sort of expressive activity is extensive and 
includes many groups with significant commercial activities or other 
nonexpressive functions. Chapters of the United States Jaycees and Rotary Clubs, 
which were the subject of two important Supreme Court decisions under the right 
410 Id. at 651.
411 Id. at 661.
412 Such operations are beyond the scope of this article. Greater regulation would be permissible 
where religious groups operate commercial enterprises.
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of association in the 1980s, are examples.413 Thus, if all secular associations 
engaging in expressive activities were exempted from government regulation 
whenever it affects internal group affairs, much of the economic life of the 
community would be beyond state control, including the nonexpressive activities 
of organizations with significant commercial purposes. For this reason, a broad 
right of autonomy for all nonreligious organizations that engage in expressive 
association may not be feasible. 
How an expanded right of expressive association might be structured and 
which organizations should be covered is beyond the scope of this paper. Justice 
O’Connor has suggested drawing a distinction between organizations that are 
primarily engaged in expressive activities and those where commercial or other 
nonexpressive purposes predominate, and she would accord the former broad 
protections unavailable to the latter.414 One might follow Justice O’Connor’s lead 
and extend a broad right of autonomy to those associations where expressive 
purposes predominate. Other organizations would still have to show a burden on 
their expression to receive relief. Such an approach seems promising, and it would 
target strong protections to the type of group most likely to supply new 
perspectives to public discussion and debate. However, whether this approach is, 
in fact, fair and workable would require further analysis. My purpose here is 
simply to point us in the right direction. Our goal should, indeed, be greater 
equality for religious and nonreligious associations, but this goal should be 
achieved by expanding protections for nonreligious groups rather than 
diminishing protections for religious groups.
To the extent that some differences remain between the treatment of 
religious and nonreligious groups, these differences need not be troubling. I have 
argued that the similar roles that religious and nonreligious groups play in 
democratic society justify strong protections for both, but these protections need 
not be exactly the same. The right of association under the Speech Clause is a 
different constitutional guarantee than the Free Exercise Clause, and the structure 
and details of the freedoms afforded under these two clauses will reflect that fact.
Moreover, the Court has never required identical treatment for religion 
and nonreligion. For many contemporary scholars, religious belief and activity are 
413 See Bd. of Directors of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 539-41, 548-49 
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no longer distinguishable from strongly-held nonreligious convictions.415
However, our constitutional regime reflects a contrary view. As many scholars 
have pointed out, the very existence of constitutional provisions dedicated 
exclusively to religion demonstrate that religion is distinctive in our constitutional 
framework.416 The Supreme Court’s decisions also support this distinctiveness. 
For example, in Smith, the Court permitted and, indeed, encouraged special 
legislative accommodations where government action burdens individual 
religious exercise. In Amos, the Court held that similar legislative 
accommodations for religious groups do not violate the Establishment Clause 
even if nonreligious groups do not receive the same benefits. According to the 
Court, “it has never indicated that statutes that give special consideration to 
religious groups are per se invalid.”417 Rather, “[w]here, as here, government acts 
with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of 
religion, we see no reason to require that the exemption comes packaged with 
benefits to secular entities.”418 While the Court’s decisions in recent years may be 
more “neutralist” than in the past, they do not embrace a thorough-going 
neutralism that treats religion and nonreligion exactly alike.
So far, I have offered a justification for protecting religious groups that 
should appeal to believers and nonbelievers alike. Religious groups and the ideas 
they generate are an important source of new perspectives for social and political 
life, and the same role played by nonreligious groups justifies strong protections 
for them as well. For many scholars, a defense of free exercise protections that is 
based, instead, on the special value of religious convictions or the special 
authority of religious commands in the lives of believers would be unconvincing 
415 See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note XX, at 1262-66; Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free 
Exercise Doctrine, supra note XX, at 926-27; see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note XX, at 39, 67-68 
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Religion, supra note XX, at 9; Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update 
and Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 717 (1992). Laycock writes:
Religion is unlike other human activities, or at least the founders thought so. The 
proper relation between religion and government was a subject of great debate in 
the founding generation, and the Constitution includes two clauses that apply to 
religion and do not apply to anything else. This debate and these clauses 
presuppose that religion is in some way a special human activity, requiring 
special rules applicable only to it.
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to nonbelievers.419 Whereas in the founding era, supporters of religious liberty 
may have defended protections on the ground that religion is, in Madison’s words, 
a “duty towards the Creator” and “precedent, both in order of time and in degree 
of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society,”420 this type of argument is not 
persuasive today. As Lupu and Tuttle have written, “Madison’s confident 
assertion of the supremacy of religious duties over secular ones no longer seems 
self-evident.”421
Before I close, I hope the reader will indulge me in such an argument. If 
the reader will permit, I will show that a view that takes seriously the ultimate 
importance of religious belief supports the same conclusions as the more 
ecumenical approach taken above. For those in the founding era and many 
believers today, the Free Exercise Clause reflects a faith in a transcendent reality 
which grounds, guides and communicates with the temporal world. It is this 
transcendent point of reference that is the source of truths for individual conduct, 
social relationships and political life, and these truths are, in turn, the basis for 
legal and political legitimacy. However, the Free Exercise Clause also reflects the 
fact that our understanding of this divinity is limited. We see but in a “mirror 
dimly.”422 Despite the many truths manifest in creation and even with the added 
light of revelation, the God we seek is yet partly hidden, and out of this mystery 
different traditions develop. These traditions all bear insights, though partial and 
incomplete, of a greater reality that remains always beyond our ken even as it 
continually beckons us to draw nearer. Without freedom to grow and develop 
unimpeded by the state, much of value within these faiths would be lost and our 
understanding would be diminished. Valuable insights are not limited to believers. 
God’s grace extends to those who do not know Him by name. The Christian 
tradition teaches that the world is fallen and correct understanding requires the 
assistance of revelation, but God has not abandoned His creation and good 
remains. Indeed, much can be known through human reason and experience, even 
unaided by faith, and believers can learn much from those outside their faith. True 
progress requires humility by all. Believers and nonbelievers need one another, 
and only together can they draw closer to the reality that orders, sustains, redeems 
and perfects the world and those within it. Thus, unless broad freedoms are 
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extended to nonreligious groups as well as religious ones, the entire community 
will suffer, believers and nonbelievers alike.   
